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ABSTRACT
We propose an economic theory of addiction based on the premise that cognitive mechanisms
such as attention affect behavior independently of preferences. We argue that the theory is consistent with
foundational evidence (e.g. from neuroscience and psychology) concerning the nature of decision-making
and addiction. The model is analytically tractable, and it accounts for a broad range of stylized facts
concerning addiction. It also generates a plausible qualitative mapping from the characteristics of
substances into consumption patterns, thereby providing a basis for empirical tests. Finally, the theory
provides a clear standard for evaluating social welfare, and it has a number of striking policy implications.
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1 Introduction
Each year, millions of U.S. consumers spend hundreds of billions of dollars on addic-
tive substances.1 Estimates for 1999 place total expenditures on tobacco products,
alcoholic beverages, cocaine, heroin, marijuana, and methamphetamines at more than
$150 billion. During a single month in 1999, more than 57 million individuals smoked
at least one cigarette, more than 41 million engaged in binge drinking (involving ﬁve or
more drinks on one occasion), and roughly 12 million used marijuana. In 1998, slightly
more than 5 million Americans qualiﬁed as “hard-core” chronic drug users. Roughly
4.6 million persons in the workforce met the criterion for a diagnosis of drug dependence
and 24.5 million had a history of clinical alcohol dependence. In 1998, additional social
costs resulting from health care expenditures, loss of life, impaired productivity, motor
vehicle accidents, crime, law enforcement, and welfare totalled $185 billion for alcohol
and $143 billion for other addictive substances. Smoking killed roughly 418,000 people
in 1990, alcohol accounted for 107,400 deaths in 1992, and drug use resulted in 19,277
deaths during 1998. Alcohol abuse contributed to 25 to 30 percent of violent crimes.
In 1999, more than 625,000 individuals were incarcerated for drug-related oﬀenses.
Public policies regarding addictive substances run the gamut from laissez faire to
taxation, subsidization (e.g. of rehabilitation programs), regulated dispensation, crim-
inalization, product liability, and public health campaigns. Each alternative policy
approach has passionate advocates and detractors. Economic analysis can potentially
inform this debate, but it requires the analyst to adopt a theory of addiction.
The ideal economic theory of addiction would satisfy four criteria. First, it would
be consistent with foundational evidence (e.g. from neuroscience and psychology) con-
cerning the nature of decision-making and addiction. Second, it would account for the
salient aspects of addictive behavior. Third, it would lend itself to tractable mathe-
matical modeling. Fourth, it would provide a clear standard for policy evaluation (i.e.
the measurement of social welfare).
A number of authors (such as Becker and Murphy [1988], Laibson [2001], Hung
[2000], and Orphanides and Zervos [1995]) have proposed theories of addiction based
on standard economic models of decision making. Others (such as Gul and Pesendorfer
[2001b], Laibson [2001], and Gruber and Koszegi [2001]) have explored various “behav-
ioral” alternatives. Unfortunately, as we discuss in we section 2, each of these theories
falls short of the ideal. Among other shortcomings, each fails to explain important
aspects of addictive behavior.
1The statistics in this paragraph were obtained from the following sources: Oﬃce of National Drug
Control Policy [2001a,b], U.S. Census Bureau [2001], Gerstein et. al. [1999], National Institute on
Drug Abuse [1998], National Institute on Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism [2001], and Center for Disease
Control [1993]. There is, of course, disagreement as to many of the reported ﬁgures.2
The purpose of this paper is develop an alternative theory of addiction that satisﬁes
the four criteria articulated above. As our starting point, we depart fundamentally
from standard economic theory by accepting the validity of the hypothesis that cogni-
tive mechanisms such as attention, which determine how an individual thinks about a
decision, aﬀect behavior entirely apart from preferences. For example, an individual
may fail to choose an alternative simply because he does not consider it, or because he
fails to consider particular consequences. When this occurs, the individual may choose
something other than the alternative that he would most prefer if he considered all op-
tions and consequences. Since this mistake results from an improper characterization
of the decision problem, we refer to the phenomenon as characterization failure.
Our theory proceeds from the premise that environmental cues aﬀect the way the
brain characterizes decision problems. In particular, with experience, the brain devel-
ops cognitive shortcuts involving functions such as attention. These shortcuts appear
to be mediated by, or at least associated with internal visceral states. For example,
when someone notices the familiar smells of a barbecue, he experiences visceral sen-
sations of hunger, and his thoughts turn to the acquisition and consumption of food.
The use of a cognitive shortcut does not necessarily lead to characterization failure;
on the contrary, an eﬃcient shortcut could economize on the costs of decision making
by focusing attention on the most promising alternatives and pertinent consequences.
Nevertheless, in the context of addictive substances, the evidence suggests that cog-
nitive shortcuts focus attention on inappropriate actions and consequences given the
individual’s objectives and preferences. Thus, environmental cues associated with past
usage inﬂuence current use through cognition (e.g. which alternatives and consequences
capture the brain’s attention) as well as through preferences.
We provide a parsimonious representation of this phenomenon in an otherwise stan-
dard model of rational addiction. Speciﬁcally, we allow for the possibility that the
individual may enter a “hot” cognitive mode in which he always chooses to consume
the substance irrespective of underlying preferences (implicitly because inappropriate
cognitive shortcuts focus attention on usage and the associated “high”), and we assume
that the likelihood of entering this state is related to past choices (implicitly because,
through conditioning, previous usage increases the probability of encountering environ-
mental cues which trigger the hot cognitive mode). The individual may also operate
in a “cold” cognitive mode, wherein he considers all alternatives and contemplates all
consequences, including the eﬀects of current choices on the likelihood of entering the
h o tc o g n i t i v em o d ei nt h ef u t u r e . 2
2Our analysis is most closely related to work by Loewenstein [1996,1999], who considers simple
models in which an individual can operate in either a hot or cold decision-making mode. Lowenstein’s
approach diﬀers from ours in at least one important respect: he assumes that behavior in the hot mode
reﬂects the application of a “false” utility function, rather than a particular (and potentially ﬂawed)3
As a matter of formal mathematics, our model involves a minimalistic departure
from the standard framework. Behavior corresponds to the solution of a dynamic
programming problem with stochastic state-dependent mistakes. Our approach there-
fore harmonizes economic theory with foundational evidence on decision making and
addiction without sacriﬁcing analytic tractability.
The model has several attractive features. It explains a broad range of important
stylized facts associated with addiction. It generates a plausible qualitative mapping
from the characteristics of substances into consumption patterns, thereby providing
the basis for empirical tests. It gives rise to a clear welfare criterion, and it has some
surprising public policy implications. For example, in some circumstances it is optimal
to subsidize the use of addictive substances even though consumption is excessive. Yet
under the same circumstances, criminalization may be superior to taxation.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes patterns
of addictive behavior. It also brieﬂy summarizes and evaluates existing theories of
addiction. Section 3 discusses foundational evidence concerning the nature of decision-
making and addiction. Section 4 presents our formal model. Section 5 explores the
model’s positive implications, including its ability to generate observed consumption
patterns and to explain the main stylized facts concerning addiction. Section 6 exam-
ines the welfare implications of various public policies. Section 7 concludes. Proofs
of propositions appear in an appendix.
2 Addictive Behavior
2.1 Patterns of addictive behavior
The consumption of addictive substances has received substantial attention in neu-
roscience, psychology, epidemiology, sociology, and economics.3 From this extensive
body of research, we have distilled eight stylized facts which, we argue, should serve as
a litmus test for evaluating the validity of any economic theory of addiction.
First, short-term abstention is common even for the most addictive substances, but
long-term recidivism rates are high (see Goldstein [2001], Hser, Anglin, and Powers
[1993], Harris [1993], and O’Brien [1997]). In many instances, addicts attempt to “kick
the habit,” but are ultimately unsuccessful. For example, during 2000, 70 percent of
current smokers expressed a desire to quit completely and 41 percent stopped smoking
mode of cognition. See also Loewenstein and Lerner [2001] for an excellent review of the evidence
concerning the eﬀects of emotions and visceral states on decision-making.
3Gardner and David [1999] provide the following list of addictive substances: (1) alcohol, (2) bar-
biturates, (3) amphetamines, (4) cocaine, (5) caﬀeine and related methylxanthine stimulants, (6)
cannabis, (7) hallucinogenics, (8) nicotine, (9) opioids, (10) dissociative anasthetics, and (11) volatile
solvents.4
for at least one day in an attempt to quit, but only 4.7 percent successfully abstained
for more than three months.4
Second, consumption and recidivism are associated with cue-conditioned cravings.
Recidivism rates are especially high when addicts are exposed to cues related to
their past drug consumption (Goldstein [2001], Goldstein and Kalant [1990], O’Brien
[1976,1997], Robins [1974], Robins et. al. [1974], and Hser et. al.). Long-term usage
is considerably lower among those who experience signiﬁcant changes of environment.5
For this reason, drug treatment programs advise recovering addicts to move to new
locations, or at least to avoid the places where previous consumption took place. A
recovering addict is also signiﬁcantly more likely to “fall oﬀ the wagon” if he receives a
small taste of his drug-of-choice (Goldstein [2001]). This phenomenon, known as “prim-
ing,” suggests that even minimal exposure to the substance serves as a powerful cue
that activates cravings.
Third, addicts continue to use drugs compulsively even though with suﬃciently
sustained use they develop tolerance with respect to the hedonic eﬀects of the sub-
stance (i.e., the quality and intensity of the high often diminishes despite increases in
dosage). The development of hedonic tolerance is a complex process.6 For some drugs,
such as cocaine, users experience a phenomenon called sensitization, in which the he-
donic eﬀects of the drug are enhanced in the short term, for example during binges.
Nevertheless, there is some agreement that a large fraction of substances and users
develop hedonic tolerance with sustained use. In a recent review of the neurobiology
of addiction, Hyman and Malenka [2001,p. 695] observe:
“The desire to elevate or otherwise alter mood often motivates initial
drug use. However, the pleasure (or relief of dysphoric moods) produced
by drugs often habituates; for drugs such as alcohol and nicotine, pleasure
can be markedly reduced over time by medical complications. Addictive
individuals sometimes describe their continuing drug use as an attempt to
re-experience remembered ‘highs’ often without success.”
Similarly, Goldstein [2001, p. 86] states that “with most addictive drugs, repeated
4Notably, more educated individuals were far more likely to quit successfully, even though education
bore little relation either to the desire to quit or to the frequency with which smokers attempted to
quit (Trosclair et. al. [2002]).
5Robins [1974] and Robins et.al. [1974] found that Vietnam veterans who were addicted to heroin
and/or opium at the end of the war experienced much lower relapse rates than other young male addicts
during the same period. A plausible explanation is that veterans encountered fewer environmental
triggers (familiar circumstances associated with drug use) upon returning to the U.S.
6The term tolerance is used to describe a wide range of physical adaptations that take place in
response to the addictive substances. For example, with repeated usage, the body (in particular the
liver) develops an increased capacity to destroy the drug. This leads to a phenomenon called metabolic
tolerance (see Goldstein [2001]).5
administration over a long time ... leads to a loss of eﬀect, so that more and more
is needed to produce the same high as before.” A user-oriented website concurs:7
“Tolerance builds up rapidly after a few doses and disappears rapidly after a couple of
days of abstinence. Heavy users need as much as eight times higher doses to achieve
the same psychoactive eﬀects as regular users using smaller amounts. They still get
stoned but not as powerfully.”
Fourth, addicts often describe themselves as powerless to regulate their consumption
of the substance. They perceive some of their past choices as mistakes, in the sense that
they think they would have been better oﬀ in the past as well as the present had they
acted diﬀerently, even when no learning has occurred. They sometimes characterize
c u r r e n tc h o i c e sa sm i s t a k e seven in the act of consumption.8 They also recognize
that they are likely to make similar mistakes in the future. It is instructive that the
twelve-step program of Alcoholic Anonymous begins as follows: “We admitted we were
powerless over alcohol - that our lives had become unmanageable.”9
Fifth, users respond to standard economic incentives such as prices and information
about the eﬀects of addictive substances.10 For example, an aggressive U.S. public
health campaign is widely credited with reductions in rates of cigarette smoking. There
is also evidence that users engage in sophisticated forward-looking deliberation, reduc-
ing current consumption in response to future price increases (Gruber and Koszegi
[2001]).
Sixth, addicts attempt to control use through various pre-commitments, such as
checking into rehabilitation centers and consuming medications that either generate
unpleasant side eﬀects or reduce pleasurable sensations if the substance is subsequently
consumed. Disulﬁram interferes with the liver’s ability to metabolize alcohol; as a
result, ingestion of alcohol produces a highly unpleasant physical reaction for a period
of time. Methadone, an agonist, activates the same opioid receptors as heroin, and
thus produces a mild high, but has a slow-onset and a long-lasting eﬀect. It thereby
reduces the high produced by heroin. Naltrexone, an antagonist, blocks speciﬁc brain
receptors, and thereby diminishes the high produced by opioids. All of these treatments
reduce the frequency of relapse.11
Seventh, use is sensitive to the deployment of attention. Exogenous attention
shocks can temporarily discourage use without providing new information. A recover-
7See htpp://www.thegooddrugsguide.com/cannabis/addiction.htm.
8Goldstein [2001,p.249] describes this phenomenon as follows: the addict had been “suddenly
overwhelmed by an irresistible craving, and he had rushed out of his house to ﬁnd some heroin.
... it was as though he were driven by some external force he was powerless to resist, even though he
knew while it was happening that it was a disastrous course of action for him” (italics added).
9See http://www.alcoholics-anonymous.org/english/E FactFile/M-24 d6.html.
10See Chaloupka and Warner [2001] and MacCoun and Reuter [2001] for a review of the evidence.
11See O’Brien [1997] and Goldstein [2001].6
ing addict is, for example, less likely to use (at least temporarily) if, while experiencing
a strong craving, he is reminded of undesirable consequences with which he is already
familiar.12 Consequently, recovering addicts exhibit a demand for attention manage-
ment therapies. Even addicts who have stayed clean for years attend support group
meetings, such as Alcoholics Anonymous, which provide no new information.13
Eighth, patterns of usage vary dramatically across addictive substances and, for
any given substance, across methods of administration and users. Caﬀeine is con-
s u m e do nar e g u l a rb a s i sa n du s e r sr a r e l ys e e kc l i n i c a li n t e r v e n t i o nt oc o n t r o lu s e ,
while cocaine users experience binging cycles and sometimes seek institutional reha-
bilitation. Cocaine and crack, though chemically identical, give rise to diﬀerent con-
sumption patterns.14 Although a sizable fraction of the population either experiments
with drugs or uses for recreation, most do not become clinically addicted.15
2.2 Existing theories
Existing economic theories of addiction include (1) variations on the standard model
of rational economic decision making (Becker and Murphy [1988]), including general-
izations that allow for random shocks and state-contingent utility (Laibson [2001] and
Hung [2000]), (2) models of “temptation” wherein well-being depends not only upon
the chosen action but also on actions not chosen (Gul and Psendorfer [2001a,2001b]
and Laibson [2001]), (3) models with present-biased preferences with either naive or so-
phisticated expectations (O’Donoghue and Rabin [1999,2000] and Gruber and Koszegi
[2001]), and (4) models with “projection bias,” wherein agents mistakenly assume
that future preferences will resemble current preferences (Loewenstein [1996,1999], and
Loewenstein, O’Donoghue, and Rabin [2001]). Each of these theories contributes to
an understanding of decision-making in general and addiction in particular. Although
a comprehensive discussion of the various behavioral alternatives is beyond the scope
of the current paper, it is important to highlight some limitations of these approaches.
For a more complete discussion, see Bernheim and Rangel [2002].
12There are, for example, references to the role of attention shocks in Massing [2000], who provides
detailed descriptions of addicts’ experiences.
13Goldstein [2001] reports that there is a shared impression among the professional community
that 12-step programs such as AA (p. 149) “are eﬀective for many (if not most) alcohol addicts.”
However, given the nature of these programs, objective performance tests are not available. The AA
treatment philosophy is based on “keeping it simple by putting the focus on not drinking, on attending
meetings, and on reaching out to other alcoholics.” Goldstein also notes that, according to AA, there
are recovering alcoholics, but not ex-alcoholics; hence the dictum “once an addict, always an addict.”
14Crack is prepared from cocaine by mixing it with baking soda and water, and then boiling it. This
has two important consequences. First, crack can be smoked, which allows the brain to absorb the
substance more eﬃciently, and leads to a quicker and more intense high. Second, crack is signiﬁcantly
cheaper, which leads to a pattern of more frequent administration.
15See Goldstein and Kalant [1990], Gazzaniga [1990,1994], and Koob and Moal [1997].7
With respect to the ﬁrst stylized fact, all of the preceding theories can, under
appropriate assumptions, account for cycles of use and abstention, as well as for quitting
by some users. If, however, one interprets an intention to quit “completely” as referring
to all future contingencies, then recidivism among intended quitters involves a failure
to follow through on a contingent plan.16 Such failures can occur with present-biased
preferences if expectations are naive, or with projection bias, but they are inconsistent
with the other possibilities mentioned above.
All of the existing theories are at odds with the third stylized fact, since they assume
that the addictive substances are distinguished by intertemporal complementarities
in consumption: the marginal utility of using the substance is assumed to increase
with previous consumption. In fact, without intertemporal complementarities nothing
would distinguish addictive and non-addictive substances; the very same self-control
problem would inﬂuence the consumption of all immediately pleasurable activities,
from injecting heroin to drinking water.
With respect to the fourth stylized fact, none of the existing theories can account
for the observation that addicts sometimes describe their current choices as mistakes.
In each instance, the decision maker maximizes a utility function that describes his
well-being at the time of choice. The anticipation of future mistakes is inconsistent
with the standard model, temptation preferences, hyperbolic discounting with naive
expectations, and projection bias. In each of these cases individuals believe that their
future behavior will be optimal when evaluated by current preferences.17 With present-
biased preferences and sophisticated expectations, the individual anticipates that future
choices may be contrary to his current desires; however, he recognizes that those choices
will be optimal for his in the future, and hence will not be mistakes when he makes
them. Finally, all of these models are unable to account for the perception that past
choices were mistakes. In every case, an individual might regret a past choice in the
sense that he would be better oﬀ today had he acted diﬀerently, but he never believes
that an alternative choice would have made him better oﬀ in the past as well as the
present.
With respect to the sixth stylized fact, the standard framework is capable of ex-
plaining voluntary admission to rehabilitation clinics and related behaviors provided
that these activities reduce the likelihood of experiencing cravings. But this is contrary
to the experience of many addicts who check into rehabilitation centers not because
they expect to avoid cravings, but rather precisely b e c a u s et h e ya n t i c i p a t ec r a v i n g sa n d
16According to Hyman and Malenka [2001,p.697], there is agreement that “cue-initiated relapses can
occur in individuals who have strongly resolved never to use drugs again, often without the addicted
person having insight into what is happening to them” (italics added).
17Although this belief is false in the last two cases, individuals nonetheless fail to anticipate future
mistakes.8
wish to control their reactions. Furthermore, even in instances where entering a reha-
bilitation center does reduce the likelihood of cravings (e.g. by removing environmental
cues), the standard framework implies counterfactually that the addict would ﬁnd the
center’s program more attractive if it made the substance available upon request (in
case of cravings). Likewise, the standard framework is hard-pressed to explain the
voluntary use of substances such as disulﬁram, which simply reduce the utility derived
from future usage. More generally, within the standard framework, the decision-maker
would avoid precommitments (decisions that eliminate future options). Similar com-
ments apply for models with projection bias, and with present-biased preferences and
naive expectations. Models with temptation preferences can explain precommitments,
but only if the elimination of the tempting alternative suppresses cravings. For the
reasons described above, this explanation is problematic. Among the existing alter-
natives, only present-biased preferences with sophisticated expectations can account
adequately for the ﬁfth stylized fact.
All of the theories mentioned above also struggle to account for the seventh stylized
fact. Since behavior is, in each instance, a direct manifestation of preferences at each
moment in time, attention shocks cannot aﬀect behavior.18
The second, ﬁfth, and eighth stylized facts pose fewer problems for existing theories.
Even though the literature contains many models of addiction that do not speciﬁcally
encompass cue-conditioned cravings, an appropriately articulated version of each ex-
isting theory can nevertheless account for the second stylized fact (see, for example,
Laibson’s [2001] extension of Becker and Murphy’s [1988] model). With intertempo-
ral complementarities, these theories are also consistent with evidence indicating that
usage is sensitive to both current and future economic incentives (the ﬁfth stylized
fact). While there has been no systematic attempt to account for the heterogeneity
of consumption patterns across addictive substances, methods of administration, and
users (the eighth stylized fact), each theory provides many dimensions of ﬂexibility.
Additional reservations concerning existing theories of addiction include the fol-
lowing. First, some of the existing theories lack explicit neuro foundations. They
are not intended to depict actual decision-making processes; rather, they are strictly
“as if” representations of behavior. Second, some of the alternatives sacriﬁce math-
ematical tractability (relative to the standard model). Models with present-biased
preferences introduce strategic considerations, and require one to depict behavior as
the equilibrium of a game played between the decision-maker and his future incarna-
tions. These equilibria can be extremely complex and challenging to characterize.
18This is not to say that the concept of attention is in itself problemmatic. As discussed in section 3,
even the standard framework can accomodate the notion that attention and preferences shift together
in response to environmental cues. It is more challenging, however, to account for the observation
that individuals learn to manage behavior by managing attention.9
It can also be diﬃcult to analyze models of temptation when preferences are deﬁned
over sets rather than over choices.19 Third, with either present-biased preferences
or temptation preferences, welfare is often ambiguous and a matter of the perspective
chosen for evaluation.
3 Foundations
Our objective in this paper is to explain addictive behavior based on general principles
concerning decision making, rather than as an idiosyncratic special case. The general
principles that we invoke allow for the possibility that the cognitive portions of the
brain’s decision-making algorithms perform poorly in identiﬁable circumstances. We
argue that addiction is a particularly severe instance of this phenomenon. In this
section, we discuss the available evidence concerning these foundational hypotheses.
3.1 Cue-Conditioned Characterization Failure
Decision making involves (at least) three types of processes: characterization, evalu-
ation, and hedonic experience. Characterization entails the deployment of cognitive
mechanisms such as attention, memory, and forecasting to identify the state of the
world, the set of possible actions, and the present and future consequences of each
action. Evaluation refers to the process by which the brain assesses the desirability of
each action under consideration in light of its projected consequences and the state of
the world. Finally, a hedonic experience, consisting of both pleasant and unpleasant
sensations, results from the state of the world and the consequences of choices.
Under appropriate assumptions concerning these three processes, one obtains the
standard model of economic decision-making. For example, one could assume that
the brain completely and correctly extrapolates the consequences of all possible alter-
natives during the characterization stage, and selects among these alternatives using a
criterion that corresponds to maximization of discounted expected hedonic experience
during the evaluation stage. In this paper we investigate the implications of more
realistic assumptions concerning the nature of characterization. We note that there
may also be valid reasons to depart from standard assumptions concerning evaluation
and experience, but we do not pursue these possibilities here (see Bernheim and Rangel
[2002] for a discussion of evidence regarding the other two processes).
Since the brain is a ﬁnite computational mechanism, it cannot consider every pos-
sible option and forecast every potential consequence. Characterization shortcuts are
thus unavoidable. Given the current state of knowledge, it is not yet possible to describe
19Gul and Pesendorfer [2001a] demonstrate that one can depict choice with temptation as the
solution to a fairly standard dynamic program under appropriately strong assumptions.10
cognitive decision-making algorithms with precision. Nevertheless, recent research ﬁnd-
ings in psychology and neuroscience provide foundations for three general principles.
First, emotional and visceral states (e.g. anger or cravings) aﬀect cognitive activities,
including attention, that play a central role in characterization. Second, certain en-
vironmental cues systematically trigger particular visceral states and the associated
cognitive modes. Third, these triggers are established through a form of learning
called cue-conditioning: with experience the brain learns to associate particular cues
with the visceral states that guide cognition to hedonically salient states, options and
consequences.
We illustrate these three principles through a simple example. When an individual
is hungry (a visceral state), his attention focuses on tasks associated with obtaining
food. Speciﬁc environmental cues, such as the smell of a barbecue, can trigger sen-
sations of hunger. Far from being hard-wired, this response is cue-conditioned: the
aroma triggers hunger because the individual has had the pleasurable experience of
consuming food at previous barbecues.
The use of cue-conditioned cognitive shortcuts does not by itself overturn the stan-
dard model. If, for example, visceral and emotional signals guide attention to ap-
propriate subsets of alternatives and consequences, the brain may select an optimal
or nearly optimal alternative even though it characterizes only a small portion of the
decision problem. In fact, the use of such shortcuts could be an eﬀective evolutionary
adaptation. The problem, as emphasized by evolutionary psychologists (see Barkow,
Cosmides, and Tooby [1995]), is that brain processes evolved to promote ﬁtness in the
hunter-gatherer world, not in the modern world. Thus, for example, panic-triggered
ﬂight responses that helped humans escape from predators as hunter-gatherers may be
counterproductive when judged by the individual’s own objectives and preferences in
many modern situations.
Accordingly, we depart from the standard model by assuming that, in some cir-
cumstances, environmental cues can induce visceral states that divert attention from
the most preferred alternatives and/or hedonically salient consequences. When this
happens, the ability of the brain to choose the most preferred option is impaired. We
refer to this phenomenon as cue-conditioned characterization failure.
If an individual repeatedly experiences characterization failure upon encountering
particular environmental conditions, he may learn to associate those conditions with
poor decision-making. This type of self-understanding may lead to a range of inter-
esting and economically important behavioral patterns. For example, individuals may
avoid situations in which they are exposed to certain cues (cue avoidance), attempt
to preclude alternatives that they tend to choose when experiencing characterization
failure (precommitment), desensitize themselves to problematic cues, or develop self-11
management techniques to counteract the eﬀects of strong visceral states (such as
counting to ten before acting).
Research in several disciplines provides foundational evidence for various aspects of
the hypotheses described above. First, visceral states appear to inﬂuence the outcome
of decision-making even when they are arguably uncorrelated with pertinent aspects of
preferences. Shoppers tend to purchase more food at the grocery store when they are
hungry, even though they know that the state of hunger is temporary (see Abratt and
Goodey [1990]). A variety of tactics used in the contexts of interrogations and legal
depositions are intended to elicit responses with long-lasting implications by induc-
ing transitory emotional reactions (Loewenstein [1996]). Likewise, salespeople often
attempt to inﬂuence consumers’ choices by manipulating visceral desires through en-
vironmental cues, even when the good in question is durable while the visceral state is
not.
Second, a series of experiments by Mischel and coauthors suggest that self-control
is sensitive to the deployment of attention and to the activation or non-activation of
particular thoughts.20 A subject (typically a child) is placed in a room and is oﬀered
a choice between an inferior prize and a superior one (one or two pieces of candy).
Subjects can obtain the inferior prize at any time by calling the experimenter, but
must wait until the experimenter returns to obtain the superior prize. In practice, the
child’s ability to wait depends crucially on whether the inferior prize is visible. Merely
covering the object signiﬁcantly enhances patience.
More generally, in Mischel’s experiments, the deployment of attention emerges as a
key determinant of self-control. Any stimulus that focuses attention on the “tempting”
features of the inferior prize increases the likelihood that the child will select it. Chil-
dren are signiﬁcantly more likely to wait if they are advised to distract themselves by
thinking about something else, or if they are provided with a toy, even when children
in a control group show no interest in the toy. Advising children not to think about
the prize is counterproductive, since this induces them to repeatedly check whether or
not they are thinking about it, thereby inadvertently activating thoughts about the
prize.21 During the course of development, children acquire self-understanding, and
begin to consciously regulate thought-generating environmental cues (“metacognitive
awareness”).22 When asked whether they would prefer to have the prize exposed or
covered, children under four exhibit no preference and are unable to justify their choice.
In contrast, those over ﬁve prefer to wait with the prize hidden, and oﬀer explanations
that suggest some understanding of the principle that exposure to the prize inﬂuences
20See Mischel [1974], Mischel and Moore [1973], Mischel, Shoda, and Rodriguez [1992], and Metcalfe
and Mischel [1999].
21This variation of the experiments is closely related to the work of Wegner [1994].
22See Metcalfe and Mischel [1999].12
attention. These ﬁndings are consistent with the hypothesis that seeing or think-
ing about the prize triggers strong visceral states (cravings) that restrict the child’s
subsequent thoughts to a limited range of activities and outcomes.23
In some settings, there is also direct evidence that visceral states inﬂuence behavior
by restricting attention to limited sets of alternatives and consequences. In particular,
fear focuses attention on the possibility of environmental threats (Janis [1967]) and on
a limited number of “ﬁght-or-ﬂight” responses (Panksepp [1988], ch. 11).
Third, research in neuroscience has identiﬁed some of the mechanisms through
which visceral states inﬂuence choice by altering cognition. LeDoux’s work on fear
is a leading example.24 Information about the environment reaches the amygdala (a
primitive brain structure that helps to initiate responses to sensory stimuli) via two
principal routes: a short “direct” route, and a long cortical route. Along the ﬁrst
route, information passes directly from the sensory thalamus to the amygdala without
intermediate processing by the neocortex. Along the second route, information is sent
from the sensory thalamus to various neocortical structures, where it is processed be-
fore proceeding to the amygdala. The short route is more primitive (in an evolutionary
sense) and permits the organism to initiate rapid responses in critical survival situa-
tions. Though slower, use of the long route permits more deliberate responses. The
existence of the short route implies that, in some circumstances, human behavior can
result with little (if any) cognitive deliberation.25
Finally, research in neuroscience also suggests that individuals cannot make sound
decisions unless visceral states guide cognition. This principle ﬁnds support in a series
of inﬂuential neurologicalstudies by Antonio Damasio and various coauthors concerning
the decision-making abilities of patients with damage to the ventromedial sector of the
prefrontal cortex.26 Injuries of this variety lead to abnormal (often muted) emotional
responses, even though a standard battery of tests reveals no cognitive impairments.
Although their “logical” reasoning facilities are intact, these individuals nevertheless
exhibit an impaired capacity for sound decision making. Based on these ﬁndings,
Damasio has formulated the “somatic marker hypothesis,” which holds that, in normal
individuals, the brain uses visceral states to simplify complex decision problems. In
Damasio’s theory, the ventromedial frontal cortex contains dispositional information
23Metcalfe and Mischel [1999] reach similar conclusions.
24See LeDoux [1992,1993,1998] and also Davis [1992a,1992b].
25Consider the following example (LeDoux, [1998]). While hiking through a park, an individual
glimpses a long stick, resembling a snake, lying on the ground. This information ﬁrst reaches his
amygdala through the short route. The amygdala automatically initiates defensive responses, includ-
ing autonomic changes such as increased blood circulation, endocrine changes such as the release of
adrenaline, and neocortical changes such as heightened alertness. Before consciously thinking about
alternatives, the hiker stops short or leaps to safety.
26See Damasio [1994], Behara et al. [1996,1997], and Bechara et. al. [1994].13
which is accumulated through experience. In any given visceral state, pre-conscious
processing uses this information to identify appropriately “marked” alternatives, which
then receive conscious consideration.
3.2 Addictive Substances and Cue-conditioned Characteriza-
tion Failure
For several decades neurobiologists have recognized that a variety of addictive sub-
stances, from alcohol to cocaine, have a powerful impact on the brain’s mesolimbic
dopamine system (MDS) (see, for example, Hyman and Malenka [2001], Nestler [2001],
and Wickelgreen [1997] for recent reviews).27 The MDS, in turn, plays a central role
in the regulation of basic behaviors. For example, experiments have shown that rats
who are given drugs that block dopamine receptors, thereby impeding the appropriate
operation of the MDS, eventually stop feeding (Berridge [1999]).
Experiments have also shown that direct stimulation of the MDS is a powerful way
to induce experimental subjects to perform a behavior. For example, in a series of
classic experiments, Olds and Milner [1954] demonstrated that rats learn to return
to locations where they have received direct electrical stimulation to the MDS. When
provided with opportunities to self-administer by pressing a lever, the rats rapidly
became addicted, giving themselves approximately 5,000-10,000 “hits” during each
one hour daily session, ignoring food, water, and opportunities to mate. Addicted rats
were willing to endure painful electric shocks to reach the lever.28 Similarly, when rats
are allowed to self-administer cocaine, they ignore hunger, reproductive urges, and all
other drives, consuming the substance until they die (Pickens and Harris [1968] and
Gardner and David [1999]).
Based on these ﬁndings, researchers proposed a variety of theories that linked the
consumption of addictive substances to the their ability to generate enormous hedonic
rewards (the “high”) by stimulating the MDS. This view parallels existing economic
theories in which users consume addictive substances to maximize pleasure.
Neurobiological support for this “pleasure principle” theory of addiction has eroded
over the course of the last decade with the accumulation of new evidence indicating
that MDS activity does not exclusively, and perhaps not even primarily, relate to the
27Of the addictive substances listed in a previous footnote, only hallucinogenics (or psychedelics)
do not seem to produce intense stimulation of the MDS. Instead, they act on a “subtype of serotonin
receptor which is widely distributed in areas of the brain that process sensory inputs” (Goldstein
[2001, p.231]). There is some disagreement as to whether hallucinogens are properly classiﬁed as
addictive substances (see Goldstein [2001, ch. 14]). Notably, laboratory animals and humans learn
to self-administer the same set of substances, with the possible exception of hallucinogenics (Gardner
and David [1999, p.97-98]).
28See Gardner and David [1999] for a summary of these experiments.14
generation of pleasure.29 This evidence includes the following ﬁndings. First, unpleas-
ant and novel stimuli that are hedonically neutral also trigger a release of dopamine
(Becerra et. al. [2001] and Schultz [1998, 2000]). Second, dopamine surges in anticipa-
tion to rewards, or cues associated with rewards, not during or after their consumption.
Furthermore, dopamine cells respond to rewards only when they occur unexpectedly.
This suggests that the MDS acts more as a learning mechanism than as a hedonic
meter (see Schultz, Dayan, and Montague [1997], and Schultz [1998, 2000]). Third,
using advanced imaging technology, Breiter et. al. [1997] have scanned addicts’ brains
during complete usage episodes, and found that the dopamine system remains active
long after the “high” has passed. Fourth, rats have normal hedonic reactions to sweet
and bitter tastes, and can learn about new hedonic stimuli, even when their ability
to transmit dopamine has been impaired through the administration of a neurotoxin
(Berridge and Robinson [1998]).
The accumulating evidence has lead neurobiologists to a new consensus view of
addiction. In this view, addictive substances directly aﬀect brain processes, such as
memory and attention, that are central to deliberative decision-making. Moreoever,
these eﬀects are poorly correlated with hedonic pleasure (i.e., preferences). According
to Hyman and Malenka’s [2001, p. 703] review of the pertinent literature, “recent ev-
idence ... (suggests) that the central behavioral features of addiction result from the
ability of drugs to usurp normal mechanisms of memory in crucial survival circuits.”30
This may help to explain the observation that addicts’ thoughts tend to focus almost
exclusively on consumption of substances during binges and while experiencing crav-
ings (Gawin [1991]).31 Notably, the literature draws a distinction between liking a
substance, which results from the experience of hedonic pleasure, and wanting a sub-
stance, which refers to aspects of decision processes that incline an addict towards
usage. It also emphasizes that wanting and liking are not always aligned. Robin-
son and Berridge [2000,p. 91] conclude that “the brain systems that are sensitized do
not mediate the pleasurable or euphoric eﬀects of drugs (drug ‘liking’), but instead
29Wickelgreen [1997, p. 35] quotes Roy Wise, one of the individuals who originally proposed the
pleasure principle theory of addiction, as follows: “I no longer believe that the amount of pleasure felt
is proportional to the amount of dopamine ﬂoating around in the brain.”
30Vorel et. al. [2001] have shown that the stimulation of memory centers can trigger strong cravings
and recidivism among rats that have previously self-administered cocaine (Vorel and Gardner [2001]
and Holden [2001a,b] provide non-technical discussions). Ungless et. al. [2001] have shown that
similar cellular mechanisms may be at work in memory and addiction (see Helmuth [2001] for a
non-technical discussion).
31Tiﬀany [1990, p. 152] summarizes various ﬁndings as follows: “Over a history of repeated practice,
the cognitive systems controlling many aspects of drug procurement and consumption take on the char-
acter of automatic systems. Thus, drug-use behaviors tend to be relatively fast and eﬃcient, readily
enabled by particular stimulus conﬁgurations, initiated and completed without intention, diﬃcult to
impede in the presence of triggering stimuli, eﬀortless, and enacted in the absence of awareness.”15
they mediate a subcomponent of reward that we have termed incentive salience (drug
‘wanting’).”32
The preceding ﬁndings provide neurobiological foundations for modeling addicts as
susceptible to cue-conditioned characterization failure. In our language, these ﬁndings
suggest that addictive substances divert addicts from optimal choices (judged according
to their own preferences, or “liking”) by promoting the development of inappropriate
decision-making shortcuts (i.e. the processes governing “wanting”).
It is important to emphasize that the mechanisms involved in addiction are com-
plex and not yet fully understood. Although there is ample evidence of a discrepancy
between “drug liking” (preferences) and “drug wanting” (decision-processes) among
addicts and experimental animals, a satisfactory explanation for the existence of this
discrepancy does not yet exist. We conjecture that evolution callibrated the process
of selecting decision-making shortcuts for problems resembling those encountered in
nature, and that this process is not properly callibrated for substances, such as drugs,
which activate the MDS with unnatural strength. Notably, most addictive substances
are not found naturally in highly potent forms, and were therefore not encountered
during the course of human evolution. Their ability to activate the MDS with great
potency, and thereby inﬂuence the shortcut-creation process, is something of a bio-
chemical ﬂuke, rather than an evolutionary adaptation.
4T h e M o d e l
In this section, we present a tractable model of addiction that is consistent with the
foundational principles discussed in section 3. The model is based on the central
simplifying assumption that the decision maker (DM) operates in one of two cognitive
modes (denoted by µ): a cold mode (µ = C), in which the brain characterizes the
decision problem perfectly, and a hot mode (µ = H), in which there is a extreme form
of characterization failure. The DM lives for an inﬁnite number of discrete periods.
Within each period, he makes two choices (sequentially). First, he selects an activity,
which we interpret as a “lifestyle” choice for the current period. Second, he decides
whether to use an addictive substance or abstain. He always makes the ﬁrst decision
in the cold mode, but can make the second decision in either the cold or hot mode.
The prevailing cognitive mode for the second decision depends upon environmental
conditions, which are in turn inﬂuenced by the ﬁrst decision. Once in the hot mode,
32Tiﬀany [1990, p.152] summarizes the pertinent research as follows: “Over a history of repeated
practice, the cognitive systems controlling many aspects of drug procurement and consumption take
on the character of automatic systems. Thus, drug-use behaviors tend to be relatively fast and
eﬃcient, readily enabled by particular stimulus conﬁgurations, initiated and completed without inten-
tion, diﬃcult to impede in the presence of triggering stimuli, eﬀortless, and enacted in the absence of
awareness.”16
he invariably attempts to use the substance even if his underlying preferences favor
abstention. Current usage increases the likelihood of triggering the hot mode in
subsequent periods. It can (but need not) also have an eﬀect on the baseline level of
well-being and on the pleasure derived from consumption in the future.
Formally, the DM enters each period in one of S +1addictive states,l a b e l l e d
s =0 ,1,...,S, which summarize the history of use. These addictive states evolve as
follows. Usage in state s ≥ 1 leads to state min{S,s +1 } in the next period. No use
leads to state max{1,s−1}. Note that it is impossible to reach state 0 from any state
s ≥ 1. However, the reverse is not true. In state s =0 ,u s el e a d st os t a t e1 ,w h i l en o
use leads to state 0. The usage state s = 0 represents a “virgin state” in which the DM
has had no contact with the substance. We use ys to denote the DM’s single-period
income when he is in state s.
At the beginning of each period, the DM chooses a “lifestyle” activity a from the
set {E,A,R}.A c t i v i t y E (“exposure”) entails a high likelihood that the DM will
encounter environmental conditions that trigger the hot mode. Examples include
attending parties at which the substance is readily available. Activity A (“avoidance”)
is less intrinsically enjoyable than E, but entails a lower likelihood of exposure to
environmental triggers. Examples include staying at home to read or attending AA
meetings. Activity R (“rehabilitation”) entails a commitment to clinical treatment
at a residential center during the current period. Activity R is even less intrinsically
enjoyable than A, it further reduces the likelihood of exposure to known environmental
triggers, and it guarantees abstention during the current period because the substance
becomes unavailable. It also entails a monetary cost rs ≥ 0 (which may depend upon
the DM’s addictive state).
After the DM selects an activity, events outside of his control randomly generate en-
vironmental cues, which potentially inﬂuence his cognitive mode and decision processes
for the duration of the period (recall that the DM always enters the next period in the
cold mode). For any initial choice a ∈{ E,A,R} and addictive state s,l e tpa
s de-
note the probability that environmental cues trigger the hot mode. Ordinarily, with
continued use, the brain learns to make stronger associations between cues and the
“high” produced by the substance, which suggests that pa
s rises with s. By assump-
tion, the brain cannot enter the hot mode from the virgin state (pa
0 = 0). However,
once the DM has been exposed to the substance, a myriad of (unconscious) cues, from
a smell to a T.V. commercial, can potentially trigger the hot mode. We summarize








In this setting, individuals who enter the hot mode experience cravings; their atten-
tion is focused on getting the drug and on experiencing the “high”. By assumption 1,17
rehabilitation can serve as either a method of precommiting to non-use despite an undi-
minished likelihood of experiencing cravings (pR
s = pA
s ), a strategy for avoiding cues
that trigger cravings (pR
s <p A
s ), or both. As mentioned previously, rehabilitation does
not preclude cravings in practice, and indeed addicts frequently enter rehabilitation to
stop themselves from using substances when cravings arise.
At the end of each period, the DM spends his available resources (ys − rs if he
has chosen R,a n dys otherwise) on ordinary expenditures, e, and expenditures on the
substance, qx (where q is the price of the substance, and x is the quantity consumed).
For simplicity we assume that the substance is only consumed at two levels, x ∈{ 0,1},
and that the DM cannot borrow or save. When the DM elects R at the outset of the
period, he is constrained to choose x =0 .
The brain assigns an instantaneous hedonic “payoﬀ” ws(e,x,a) based on consump-
tion (e and x), the activity chosen at the outset of the period (a), and the DM’s
addictive state (s). We take ws to be strictly increasing in e, and we impose addi-
tional restrictions below in assumption 2. The dependence of the payoﬀ function (and
income) on the addictive state incorporates the eﬀect of past usage on current well-
being, including the eﬀect of hedonic tolerance and of any health and socioeconomic
costs of substance use. When pondering the desirability of any possible set of cur-
rent and future outcomes, the DM always discounts future payoﬀs at a constant rate δ
(irrespective of his cognitive state).
Note that the DM’s instantaneous payoﬀ is assumed to be independent of µ.T h i s
implies that when a cue triggers cravings, the DM enters a hot cognitive mode, but
his preferences do not change. This contrasts with the more conventional assumption
that cravings are equivalent to cue-triggered changes in tastes (Laibson [2001]). In
practice, the same cues that trigger the hot cognitive mode may also aﬀect preferences.
In this case, µ would enter as an argument of ws, and utility would be state-dependent.
Although this would complicate the problem somewhat, it would not inject any funda-
mental analytic diﬃculties. We nevertheless focus on the case in which ws is invariant
with respect to cues because we can more clearly elucidate the implications of charac-
terization failure by studying the phenomenon in isolation, rather than in combination
with hedonic eﬀects.
At this point, it is useful to provide some simpliﬁed notation. The individual’s
budget constraint requires e + qx + rs = ys. Deﬁne ua
s ≡ ws(ys,0,a); ba
s ≡ ws(ys −
q,1,a)−ua
s for a ∈{ E,A},a n dcs ≡ uR
s −ws(ys −rs,0,R) ≥ 0 (with strict inequality
when rs > 0). Intuitively, ua
s represents the baseline payoﬀ associated with successful
abstention in state s and activity a, ba
s represents the marginal instantaneous beneﬁt
from use that the individual receives in state s after taking activity a,a n dcs represents
the cost of rehabilitation. Thus, ua
s+ba
s is the payoﬀ for usage, and uR
s −cs is the payoﬀ18
associated with rehabilitation. Let ps =( pE
s ,p A
s ,p R
s ), us =( uE
s ,u A
s ,u R
s ), bs =( bE
s ,b A
s ),
θs =( ps,u s,b s,c s), and θ =( θ0,...,θ S) (likewise for p, u, b,a n dc). The vector θ
speciﬁes all the parameters of the consumption problem. These parameters are aﬀected
by the properties of the substance, the method of administration, the characteristics
of the individual user, and the public policy environment. In keeping with our earlier







We also sometimes assume that the substance in question has the following addi-
tional properties:
Deﬁnition A substance is destructively addictive if, for all a and s =0 ,...,S− 1, we
have ba








s+1,a n dcs ≤ cs+1.
A destructively addictive substance generates an immediate “high,” except possibly
in state 0 (see the discussion of acquired tastes below). The probability of entering the
hot mode and the cost of rehabilitation increase with the addictive state. The payoﬀs
associated with both abstention and use declines (possibly due to the mechanisms that
produce tolerance). In contrast to other theories which assume that bs in increasing,
here it may increase, decrease, or remain constant with s.
As mentioned at the outset of this section, we model characterization failure by
assuming that the DM always chooses to consume the substance when µ = H.O n e
can imagine a number of plausible underlying cognitive mechanisms: environmental
cues may induce the brain to focus attention on options involving use of the substance,
or to ignore a variety of consequences other than the pleasure of the high. The
particular mechanism is unimportant from our perspective. The key assumption here
is simply that, when in the hot mode, the brain systematically mischaracterizes the
DM’s opportunity set in a way that induces him to consume the addictive substance.
By contrast, in the cold mode, the DM considers all possible courses of action and
perfectly forecasts all future consequences, including the probability of entering the hot
mode, which may lead to unwanted usage. Under these assumptions, the operations
of the brain in the cold can be modeled as a simple dynamic stochastic programming
problem. Maximization of discounted expected utility in each addictive state yields a
value function Vs(θ) (measured as of the beginning of a period). For each state, there
are ﬁve possible contingent plans available to the DM: engage in activity E and then
use the substance when in the cold mode ((a,x)=( E,1)), engage in E and refrain
from use when in the cold mode ((a,x)=( E,0), henceforth “half-hearted abstention”),
engage in A and use when in in the cold mode ((a,x)=( A,1)), engage in A and refrain
from use when in the cold mode ((a,x)=( A,0), henceforth “concerted abstention”),19
or enter rehabilitation ((a,x)=( R,0)). For s ≥ 1, the expected payoﬀs associated














sδVmin{S,s+1}(θ)f o ra = E,A (2)
λR,0
s = uR
s − cs +δVmax{1,s−1}(θ)( 3 )
Moreover, the value function must satisfy the following condition for each state s:




Note that the parameter pR
s does not appear in the equations deﬁning the value
functions. Since, by assumption, cognitive modes are hedonically neutral, the para-
meter pR
s has no eﬀect on the DM’s choice, nor on his well-being.
We conclude this section with a few remarks about the model. First, it reduces to a
standard problem when pa
s =0f o ra l ls. As discussed in the previous section, this may
be a reasonable assumption for substances that do not impact the neural mechanisms
governing incentive salience (that is “wanting” as opposed to “liking”) with the same
strength as drugs. Second, rehabilitation does not serve any purpose in this model
other than pre-commitment.34 Third, we have assumed that the DM can commit to
rehabilitation only one period at a time. Since the DM starts each period in the cold
mode, this is without loss of generality.
5 Positive Analysis
We characterize the solution to the DM’s optimization problem in the next two sub-
sections. We begin by describing optimal choices within a period when continuation
payoﬀs are governed by a given value function Vs(θ). We then explore the properties
of the optimized value function and the associated decision functions. The remaining
subsections examine implications for use.
33The associated valuation expressions for s = 0 are virtually identical, except that V0(θ)r e p l a c e s
Vmax{1,s−1}(θ).
34In practice, rehabilitation programs may also teach self-management skills and desensitize addicts
to cues. By practicing self-management skills, an addict may be able to alter the thoughts and images
that the brain activates during the hot mode. Similarly, desensitization decreases the probability of
entering the hot mode at any usage state. One can model these possibilities by assuming that ps (for
a given state or states) declines subsequent to rehabilitation or therapy. Since the evidence suggests
that these treatments are not completely eﬀective (Goldstein [2001,p.188]), the forces described here
would still come into play after treatment.20
5.1 Optimal choice within a period
Suppose that Vs(θ) describes continuation payoﬀs from the next period forward, and
consider the DM’s choice problem in any state s. I ti se a s yt oc h e c kt h a tt h eD M
never selects (A,1). This is intuitive: if he intends to consume the substance, there is
no cost associated with exposure to cues that trigger the hot cognitive state.











































∆Vs(θ) measures the incremental future cost of usage in the current period. The
constant µs(a,x) deﬁnes the value of ∆Vs(θ) for which the DM is indiﬀerent between
(a,x)a n d( E,0) (that is, λa,x
s −λE,0
s = 0). The constant µA
s (R,0) deﬁnes the value of
∆Vs(θ) for which the DM is indiﬀerent between (R,0) and (A,0).
Simple algebraic manipulation of equations (1) through (3) reveals that the DM’s
set of optimal choices in state s, χs(θ), satisﬁes:
(E,1) ∈ χs(θ)i f a n d o n l y i f ∆ Vs(θ) ≤ µs(E,1);
(E,0) ∈ χs(θ)i f a n d o n l y i f ∆ Vs(θ) ∈ (µs(E,1),min{µs(A,0),µ s(R,0)});






(R,0) ∈ χs(θ) if and only if either µs(A,0) ≤ µs(R,0) and ∆Vs(θ) ≥ µA
s (R,0), or
µs(A,0) ≥ µs(R,0) and ∆Vs(θ) ≥ µs(R,0);
These conditions are summarized in ﬁgure 1. It is easy to check that assumptions
1a n d2i m p l yt h a t0<µ s(E,1) < min{µs(A,0),µ s(R,0)},a n dµs(A,0) ≤ µs(R,0)
iﬀ max{µs(A,0),µ s(R,0)}≤µA
s (R,0). Thus, as shown in the ﬁgure, there are two
possible cases, deﬁned according to whether µs(R,0) ≶ µs(A,0). In both cases the
DM selects (E,1) for low values of ∆Vs(θ), either concerted or half-hearted abstention
for intermediate values, and (R,0) for suﬃciently large values. This is intuitive: since
∆Vs(θ) measures the future costs of current use, the DM is more likely to consume
when ∆Vs(θ) is lower. Note that whole-hearted abstention is possible only in case 2.
Figure 2 illustrates the relation between the value function and the decision rule.
Consider a substance for which the value function is decreasing in s (as shown in21
theorem 4 below, this property holds for any destructively addictive substance) and
µs(A,0) <µ s(R,0). The term ∆Vs(θ) measures the “steepness” of the value function.
The previous analysis implies that the DM uses the substance in states for which the
value function is ﬂat, enters rehabilitation in states for which it is steep, and attempts
to abstain (either half-heartedly or concertedly) for intermediate cases.
In general, bE
s < 0 does not rule out intentional consumption of the substance in
state s (that is, (E,1)). This can occur if the value function is increasing in the state
s.W h e n bE
0 < 0a n d( E,1) ∈ χ0(θ), we say that the substance gives rise to an acquired
taste. Certain methods of consuming alcohol and nicotine (e.g. beer and cigars) are
sometimes identiﬁed as examples of this phenomenon.
5.2 Dynamic optimization
In the previous section, we characterized optimal choicesfor an arbitrary value function.
We now turn our attention to the properties of the optimized value function, and we
explore implications for optimal dynamic choice.
Since the model is formulated at a reasonably high level of generality, we are unable
to provide closed-form analytic solutions. Instead, we characterize the directional eﬀect
of each parameter on the value function and on optimal usage. We begin with a simple
result concerning the value function.35





k ,a n dbA
k , and weakly decreasing in pE
k , pA
k , and ck.
This result is intuitive. When ba
k or ua
k increase, or when ck decreases, the same
decision rule must yield weakly higher valuations for every state s; hence, Vs(θ) cannot
decline. A slightly diﬀerent argument is needed to establish the monotonicity with
respect to pa
k.
H e n c e f o r t h ,w ew i l ls a yt h a tusage in state s is (weakly) increasing in a parameter if
an increase in the parameter leads the DM to choose, for that state, a course of action
associated with a higher probability of usage.36 Recall that (E,1) is associated with
the highest probability of usage, followed (in order) by (E,0), (A,0), and (R,0) (the
DM never chooses (A,1)).
As shown in the preceding section, optimal choices depend not upon the absolute
size of Vs(θ)i na n ys t a t es, but rather on the diﬀerences in valuation across states (that
35As mentioned previously, pR
k is an irrelevant parameter.
36Since the optimal action in any state need not be unique, a technical clariﬁcation is required.
We say that usage in state s is higher with parameter vector θ than with θ if any element of the
(possibly empty) set χj(θ)\χj(θ) involves a lower probability of usage than any element of χj(θ), and
any element of the (possibly empty) set χj(θ)\χj(θ)involves a higher probability of usage than any
element of χj(θ).22
is, ∆Vs(θ)). Consequently, the critical question with respect to behavior is not whether
a change in some particular parameter raises or lowers Vj(θ), but rather whether the
absolute change in valuation is larger in some states than in others. For this reason,
Theorem 1 might at ﬁrst appear to be of limited use with respect to characterizing
behavioral responses to changes in parameters. On the contrary, the result turns out
to be extremely useful. In the appendix, we show that a change in an element of θk
(the parameters aﬀecting the instantaneous payoﬀ in the addictive state k) has a larger
eﬀect on the value function for states that are closer to k (see lemma 1). Consequently,
if the value function is increasing in a particular state k parameter, an increase in this
parameter increases ∆Vj(θ)f o rj<k , and reduces ∆Vj(θ)f o rj>k(see lemma 2 in
the appendix). It then follows from the analysis in the previous section that usage
increases in states j<k , and decreases in states ˙ j>k . Supplementing this line of proof
with some additional arguments, we obtain a reasonably complete characterization of
comparative dynamics:
Theorem 2: Usage in state j is:
( i )w e a k l yi n c r e a s i n gi nba
k and ua
k, and weakly decreasing in pa
k and ck, for k>j ,
(ii) weakly decreasing in ba
k and ua
k, and weakly increasing in pa
k and ck, for
k<j ,
(iii) weakly decreasing in pE
j and uR
j and weakly increasing in bE
j and cj.
This theorem establishes that use in state s is monotonic with respect to most
parameters and indicates the direction of the eﬀect. The only exceptions concern
the eﬀects of bA
j , uA
j ,a n duE
j on usage in state j, which can be positive or negative,
depending on the parameter values.37 Interestingly, while changes in pE
k and ck aﬀect
usage in states j ￿= k in the same direction, they have opposite eﬀects in state k.
Theorem 2 underscores the fact that policy changes can have complicated behav-
ioral eﬀects. For example, a policy that reduces usage in the late stages of addiction by
decreasing the cost of rehabilitation may also increase use and discourage rehabilitation
at earlier stages. This eﬀect may be particularly strong when subsidized rehabilitation
is only oﬀered to the most serious addicts. Indeed, an increase in the cost of rehabil-
itation for highly addicted states may unambiguously reduce both total use, and use
at higher states, by inducing a shift to rehabilitation at an earlier state. This is an
argument for early intervention. Similarly, a reduction in pa
k reduces unintended usage,
but it increases intentional usage among new users.
37An increase in bA
j or uA
j can shift the optimal state j choice from either (E,0) or (R,0) to (A,0).
An increase in uE
j can induce a shift from (E,1) to (E,0) in state j if, for example, (E,1) is optimal
in states j − 1a n dj + 1. It can also induce a shift from (E,0) to (E,1) in state j if, for example,
(R,0) is optimal in states j − 1a n dj +1 .23
Theorem 2 considers the eﬀects of changing parameters for one addictive state at a
time. To compare behavior across diﬀerent users, substances, methods of administra-
tion, or policy regimes, it is often necessary to consider alternative parameter vectors
that diﬀer in all addictive states. Fortunately, theorem 2 facilitates such comparisons.
The following corollary provides an illustration.
Corollary: Consider some θ derived from ws(e,x,a),a n dθ￿ derived from w￿
s(e,x,a)=
ws(e,x,a)+ds.
(i) If, for some k,w eh a v edk ≤ ds for s<kand dk ≥ ds for s>k ,t h e nu s a g ei n
state k is weakly higher with θ than with θ￿.
(ii) If ds is weakly decreasing in s, then usage is weakly higher with θ than with θ￿ for
all states s.
The corollary describes the manner in which usage varies with the pattern of baseline
well-being over addictive states. It allows for the possibility that θ diﬀers from θ￿
in all states. Nevertheless, it derives the following unambiguous prediction (part
(ii)): when there is greater deterioration of baseline well-being as the addictive state
increases, usage is lower in all states. To prove part (i), consider θ￿￿ derived from
w￿
s(e,x,a)=ws(e,x,a)+dk. Clearly, usage is identical for θ and θ￿￿ (utility diﬀers
only by a constant). But theorem 2 implies that usage in state k is higher for θ￿￿
than for θ￿. To prove part (ii), note that the condition in part (i) is satisﬁed for all s
whenever ds is weakly decreasing in s.
The previous results provide conditions under which changes in the parameters
produce monotonic changes in behavior. By contrast, the next result identiﬁes circum-
stances in which parameter changes have no eﬀect on the optimal decision (or the value
function).
Theorem 3: χj(θ) and Vj(θ) are invariant with respect to:





j , and cj when (E,1) ∈ χj(θ)
(ii) any increase in pa
k and ck or any decreases in ba
k and ua
k when k>jand
(R,0) ∈ χn(θ) for some n ∈ {j,...,k −1}
(iii) any increase in pa
k and ck or any decreases in ba
k and ua
k when k<jand
(E,1) ∈ χn(θ) for some n ∈{ k +1 ,...,j}
Part (i) states that, if (E,1) is optimal in state j, then no (global or local) change
in any of the listed parameters (subject to the restrictions of assumptions 1 and 2)
can aﬀect behavior in state j. Strikingly, one cannot induce a state j user to enter
rehabilitation by reducing the state j rehabilitation cost.38 Similarly, one cannot induce
38However, one can induce a state j user to accept rehabilitation by paying him to enter rehabilita-
tion, a possibility we have ruled out by assuming that rj ≥ 0.24
a state j user to abstain by reducing the state j probability of entering the hot mode.
Part (ii) of theorem 3 states that a (global or local) increase in pa
k or ck,o ra( g l o b a lo r
local) decrease in ua
k or ba
k, have no eﬀect on the usage or welfare of an earlier state j
when there is an intermediate state n ∈ {j,...,k−1} for which rehabilitation is optimal.
Part (iii) is similar to part (ii).
We close this section with an intuitive result concerning destructively addictive
substances. In particular, for any such substance, the DM’s optimized well-being
declines monotonically with the addictive state. It follows immediately that the DM
never intentionally acquires a taste for a destructively addictive substance.
Theorem 4: For any destructively addictive substance, Vs(θ) ≥ Vs+1(θ) for all s.
Moreover, bE
0 < 0 implies (E,1) / ∈ χ0(θ).
5.3 Patterns of use
Since the model generates a mapping from parameters (which depend upon the char-
acteristics of the user, substance, method of administration, and policy regime) to
consumption patterns, it is possible in principle to confront the model with data and
to test its implications. Although empirical work is beyond the scope of the current
paper, in this section we show through a series of examples that the model generates a
broad range of consumption patterns that are observed in practice, as well as a plau-
sible qualitative mapping between parameters and behavior. This discussion is based
on robust numerical examples which, given the length of the paper, are omitted.
5.3.1 Use and non-use
Certain substances are associated with consistent use. Caﬀeine is a familiar example.
The key characteristics of caﬀeine are as follows: it produces a “high” in every state
(bs > 0); it slowly generates tolerance and withdrawal symptoms with sudden absten-
tion; and, if consumed in large amounts, it gradually creates long-term adverse health
consequences such as anxiety and sleep disturbances (see Goldstein [2001,ch.13]). To
understand the implications of our model for a substance such as caﬀeine, consider ﬁrst
a hypothetical substance that confers a constant positive beneﬁts (bs = b0 > 0) and
for which utility is independent of the addictive state (ws(e,x,a)=w(e,x,a)f o ra l l
s). In this case, (E,1) is the optimal choice in all states. This is intuitive: usage is
optimal when it is pleasurable and there are no future consequences. By an analogous
argument, consistent use remains optimal as long as the parameters θs do not change
much from one state to the next, as in the case of caﬀeine. In this instance, ∆Vs(θ)
is small and one still has ∆Vs(θ) <µ s(E,1) =
bE
s
δ . For such a substance, well-being
may nevertheless decline signiﬁcantly from state 0 to state S.25
In contrast, the model produces non-use (meaning that the DM does not select
(E,1) in any state) whenever ∆Vs(θ) >µ s(E,1) =
bE
s
δ for all s. This occurs for any
substance (or user) that produces a suﬃciently mild high (bE
s small) or suﬃciently
harmful consequences (for example, ws(e,x,a)=w(e,a)+ds,w h e r eds is steeply
decreasing in s). The DM never begins using such a substance and, if placed in an
addictive state s>0, he does not use intentionally.
Characterization failure plays no role in explaining consistent use. It is easy to
check that, if (E,1) is optimal in all addictive states, then the DM elects consistent use
irrespective of the probability parameters pa
s. In contrast, characterization failure can
play an important role in explaining non-use. An individual may choose not to use a
s u b s t a n c ei ns o m es t a t eb e c a u s eh ef e a r st h el i k e l i h o o do fc u e - i n d u c e du s a g ei nm o r e
advanced addictive states. In particular, many people may refrain from experimenting
with “hard drugs” because they fear that frequent use could produce a downward spiral
of addiction.
5.3.2 Intermittent use and forms of abstention
For substances such as alcohol and cocaine, the deleterious consequences of consump-
tion (e.g. health eﬀects and interference with normal personal and social activities)
are greater for heavy users than for light users. Within the context of our model, this
characteristic produces many of the usage patterns associated with these substances.
Assume in particular that ua
s and ua
s+ba
s decline with s, and that the rate of decline
accelerates with s. The associated value function tends to inherit these properties.
Assuming that the incremental beneﬁts of use, ba
s, are relatively constant, the resulting
increase in ∆Vs(θ) across addictive states tends to shift the DM toward abstention.
If the increase is suﬃciently gradual, a region of use (states s such that ∆Vs(θ) <
µs(E,1 ) )i sf o l l o w e db yar e g i o ni nw h i c ht h eD Ms e l e c t sa c t i v i t yE with the intention
of abstaining (states s such that ∆Vs(θ) ∈ (µs(E,1),min{µs(A,0),µ s(R,0)})). This
gives rise to intermittent use. The DM is initially attracted to the substance because it
delivers an enjoyable high, and because light use is relatively innocuous. However, as
repeated use begins to take its toll, the individual decides that moderation is desirable.
To illustrate, suppose that S = 4 and the optimal choices are (E,1) for states 0 and
1, and (E,0) for states 2 through 4 (see the left half of ﬁgure 2, states 0 through 4).
In that case, the DM chooses to start using the substance, and continues using it for
a second period. Subsequently, provided that he remains in the cold cognitive mode,
he uses the substance in alternate periods, moving back and forth between states 1
and 2. Of course, with some probability, the DM encounters environmental cues that
trigger the hot cognitive mode, which results in use of the substance. This moves
him to a higher addictive state, where the likelihood of triggering the hot mode is26
even greater. In other words, the intermittent user is susceptible to cue-conditioned
cravings,w h i c hc a ns e to ﬀunintended binges. Indeed, if he encounters a sequence of
environmental cues, he may ﬁnd himself in state 4 after using the substance against
his better judgement for several consecutive periods. Over time, the DM settles into
a stochastic steady state, distributing his time between states 1 to 4.39
In the previous example, the DM always engages in half-hearted abstention: e.g. an
alcoholic intends to abstain, but nevertheless attends a party at which alcohol is readily
available, knowing that the temptation to indulge may be impossible to resist. If
∆Vs(θ) continues to increase gradually over addictive states, and if µs(A,0) <µ s(R,0)
for the relevant states, a region in which the DM selects E with the intention of
a b s t a i n i n gm a yb ef o l l o w e db yar e g i o ni nw h i c hh es e l e c t sa c t i v i t yA with the intention





). In comparison to
E,a c t i o nA is less intrinsically enjoyable, but reduces the likelihood of encountering
environmental cues that trigger the hot cognitive mode. Thus, one can think of the
course of action (A,0) as concerted abstention through cue avoidance (e.g. choosing
to read a book at home rather than attend the party).
To illustrate the resulting consumption patterns, modify the preceding example
by adding two additional states, s =5 ,6, in which, as depicted in ﬁgure 2, the DM
selects (A,0). Once again, the DM chooses to start using the substance, and continues
using it for a second period. He then engages in half-hearted abstention, which may
o rm a yn o tb es u c c e s s f u l . F o rat i m e ,h eb o u n c e sb e t w e e ns t a t e s2a n d4 ,i ns o m e
instances consuming intentionally, and in others attempting half-hearted abstention
with varying success. With the passage of suﬃcient time, he inevitably ﬁnds himself
in state 5, wherein the consequences of continued use are more severe. At this point,
he becomes more determined to take a break from the substance, and chooses to avoid
the settings in which he encounters environmental cues that trigger usage.
5.3.3 Rehabilitation and recidivism
In practice, alcohol and substance abusers tend to seek treatment (rehabilitation) when
they view the consequences of continued use as suﬃciently dire, and when they despair
of controlling their behavior without assistance. Within the context of our model,




decline rapidly with s among heavy users. One can depict the second characteristic by
assuming that the probability of triggering the hot mode, pa
s, is substantial for heavy
users. Under the ﬁrst assumption, ∆Vs(θ) is large; under the second assumption,
39The tendency for unintended consumption to produce binging is even more pronounced if, once
in the hot cognitive state, the DM temporarily becomes more susceptible to environmental cues. To
model this eﬀect, one could allow pa
s to depend upon µt−1 (that is, assume that the probability of the
hot cognitive mode is given by pa(st,µ t−1), with pa(s,H) >p a(s,C)).27
µs(R,0) and µA
s (R,0) are small. With this combination of conditions, our model
produces realistic usage patterns involving rehabilitation and recidivism.
When ∆Vs(θ) rises gradually and/or the pertinent threshold (either µs(R,0) and
µA
s (R,0)) declines gradually with s, the DM chooses to enter rehabilitation only after
unsuccessfully attempting to abstain. This is illustrated once again in ﬁgure 2 (states
0 to 8 only). For concreteness, assume that S = 8, that the optimal choices are as
before for states 0 to 6, and that the DM selects (R,0) for states 7 and 8. Once
again, the DM chooses to start using the substance, and continues using it for a second
period. He then attempts half-hearted abstention. If this is unsuccessful, the adverse
consequences of continued use increase, so he makes a concerted attempt to abstain.
If this is also unsuccessful, his well-being becomes even more vulnerable to continued
use, so he enters a rehabilitation clinic.
When the DM emerges from rehabilitation, he resumes his attempt to abstain
(concertedly) from use. If he is successful, his addictive state declines, and his eﬀorts
to abstain become half-hearted. With continued success, he may resume intermittent
use, bouncing between addictive states 1 and 2. However, as long as pA
s > 0 for all s,
the DM returns to rehabilitation in ﬁnite time with probability one. Thus, the model
gives rise (inevitably) to long-term recidivism even when rehabilitation is followed by
short-term abstention.
W h e nt h er i s ei n∆ Vs(θ) or the change in the pertinent threshold is suﬃciently
sharp, the DM chooses to enter rehabilitation without passing through addictive states
in which he attempts to abstain. That is, one can have situations in which, for example
(with S = 5), optimal choices are (E,1) for states 0 through 3 and (R,0) for states 4 and
5. One natural way to construct such an example is to assume that ba
s declines sharply
between two consecutive addictive states. In such cases, the model produces cycling
between use and rehabilitation. The DM enters rehabilitation in each instance without
any desire to stay clean; he knows that he will resume using the substance upon release
from rehabilitation, and fully expects to enter rehabilitation once again. We refer
to this pattern as intentional recidivism. I ti si nf a c to b s e r v e da m o n gs e r i o u sh e r o i n
users when repeated use dilutes the “high” (see Massing [2000]). This is evidence of
fairly sophisticated, forward thinking among junkies whose objective is to renew the
high by temporarily getting clean. Characterization failure plays a perverse role in
producing in this pattern: the DM checks into a rehabilitation clinic because there is a
risk that he might not be able to abstain on his own, decreasing even further his ability
to experience the high.28
5.3.4 Resignation
Even for extremely harmful substances such as crack and heroin, the damage associated
with incremental usage may level oﬀ once social networks have been destroyed, jobs
have been lost, and poor health has become the norm. Within the context of our




decelerates for the heaviest users. In that case, the value function ﬂattens out for large
s, as shown in the right half of ﬁgure 2. If the adverse consequences of usage are also
initially slow to develop, then the value function Vs(θ) tends to inherit the “inverted-S”
s h a p es h o w ni nt h eﬁ g u r e . A ti n t e r m e d i a t ea d d i c t i v es t a t e s ,t h eD Mm a ye n g a g ei n
concerted abstention, or even enter rehabilitation. If, due to adverse circumstances,
his addictive state continues to rise, his eﬀorts to abstain may become increasingly
half-hearted. When he reaches states for which Vs(θ) is suﬃciently ﬂat, the addict
returns to intentional consumption. This occurs because the incremental harm from
usage and the probability of successful abstention are both suﬃciently low. We refer
to this pattern as resignation; the addict gives up, accepts failure, and “lets himself
go.” It is commonly observed among long-term crack and heroin users who settle into
subsistence lifestyles at the fringes of society.
5.3.5 Quitting
As noted in section 2.1, users of addictive substances often attempt to quit permanently,
but achieve limited success. Our model produces many of the patterns associated with
quitting.
In some of the preceding examples, the courses of action (E,0) and (A,0) represent
decisions to take a break from the substance, rather than to quit. In contrast, an
individual in addictive state s who wishes to quit using a substance would, in the cold
mode, select a course of action other than (E,1) in every state s ≥ 1. When continued
use is suﬃciently harmful (e.g. ws(e,x,a)=w(e,a)+ds,w h e r eds decreases rapidly
in s) and insuﬃciently pleasurable (ba
s small), this pattern is optimal.40 To illustrate
some phenomena associated with quitting, imagine again that S = 5, that the optimal
choices are (E,0) for states 1 through 2 and (A,0) for states 3 through 5. This DM
wishes to quit, in the sense that he always chooses not to consume when in the cold
mode. If his state of addiction is advanced (s ≥ 3), he avoids the cues that trigger
cravings. Once he successfully reduces his addictive state (s<3), he allows himself to
40This does not rule out the possibility that (E,1) is optimal in state 0, which explains why the
individual ﬁrst began to use the substance. Alternatively, one can assume that the individual’s
preferences changed since he starting using the substance, that he learned the true values of various
parameters only after experimenting with the substance, or that his initial decision to use (e.g. as a
youth) was irrational.29
engage in pleasurable activities that are more likely to trigger cravings, but continues
to abstain whenever possible.
In our model, the success of any attempt to quit (as measured by the frequency
of non-use) depends upon two factors. The ﬁrst factor is the individual’s underlying
susceptibility to characterization failure, measured by pa
s.A s l o n g a s pa
s > 0f o rs ≥ 1,
the individual never succeeds in quitting completely: there is always some probability
of renewed use. Notably, this is one of the central tenets of Alcoholics Anonymous:
“So far as can be determined, no one who has become an alcoholic has
ever ceased to be an alcoholic. The mere fact of abstaining from alcohol for
months or even years has never qualiﬁed an alcoholic to drink ‘normally’ or
socially. Once the individual has crossed the borderline from heavy drinking
to irresponsible alcoholic drinking, there seems to be no retreat... [I]f you
are an alcoholic, you will never be able to control your drinking for any
length of time.”41
The second factor is the extent to which the individual is willing to engage in
concerted abstention through cue avoidance. For the same probability parameters,
the DM will plainly achieve greater success if he selects (A,0) in all addictive states,
rather than in a subset of states, as in the preceding example. Avoidance of familiar
environmental triggers is an important feature of many treatment programs.
Any individual who engages in either concerted or half-hearted abstention (whether
to quit or take a break from use) will manifest a demand for attention management
therapies. The purpose of such therapies is to divert attention from environmental cues
that trigger the hot cognitive mode, to refocus attention on consequences that return
the individual to the cold cognitive mode before he takes action, or to desensitize
the individual to established cues. Without formally modeling the attention process,
one can capture the eﬀects of these therapies in a stylized way as a reduction in the
state-and-action-speciﬁc probability of entering the hot cognitive mode (that is, pa
s).
A c c o r d i n gt ot h e o r e m1 ,Vs(θ) is weakly decreasing in pa
k. Moreover, it is easy to show
that Vs(θ) is strictly decreasing in pa
s whenever (a,0) = χs(θ). In that case, the DM is
willing pay a positive price (measured either as a reduction in ys, or as a utility penalty
reﬂecting time and eﬀort) in return for therapy that reduces pa
s.
5.4 Other implications for addictive behavior
Some of the stylized facts concerning addiction discussed in section 2.1 have formal
counterparts within our analysis, while others do not. In particular, the consumption
patterns described above demonstrate that the model can account for the ﬁrst, second,
41See http://www.alcoholics-anonymous.org/english/E Pamphlets/P-2 d1.htm30
third, ﬁfth, and sixth stylized facts, as well as for the value of attention management
therapies. In this section we argue that the model is also consistent with the remaining
facts.
We have noted that addicts experience feelings of powerlessness. In our model, the
individual sometimes consumes the substance despite intending to abstain. When the
likelihood of experiencing cravings is suﬃciently high, the intention to abstain rarely
translates into action. It stands to reason that the anticipation of consistent failure
would translate into a feeling of powerlessness.
Likewise, we have observed that addicts report feelings of regret and the sense that
they are making mistakes even during theact of consumption, as well astheanticipation
that they will continue to make mistakes in the future. Our theory is predicated on the
notion that individuals anticipate future mistakes, and recognize that current actions
can trigger those mistakes. With respect to consumption-in-progress, a user will
experience concurrent regret if characterization failure is suﬃciently short-lived (that
is, if he returns to the cold mode immediately after administering the substance, while
he is beginning to, or in the process of, enjoying the high). Stepping outside our simple
model, one can also imagine a cognitive process through which the DM learns, and is
at least peripherally aware at all times, that he tends to make poor decisions in the
hot mode.
We have also observed that the eﬀects of addictive substances vary considerably
across users. In particular, only a fraction of those who experiment with drugs early
in life become addicts. Our theory oﬀers one possible explanation: those who are more
susceptible to develop characterization failure, perhaps due to genetic diﬀerences, are
more vulnerable to addiction.42 This explanation is consistent with the observation
that brain circuitry diﬀers systematically between addicts and non-addicts.43 If cor-
rect, it suggests a useful method for identifying young individuals at risk of addiction
(e.g. through cognitive tests along the lines of the experiments conducted by Mis-
chel and others, which we discussed in section 3.1).44 An important open question
is whether the succeptibility to characterization failure is a general trait, which would
explain addictive personalities, or something that is speciﬁc to the individual and sub-
stance, which would give rise to idiosyncratic vulnerabilities.
42See Goldstein [2001,ch. 7] for a discussion of the evidence of the role of genes in addiction.
43Using brain imaging technologies, Volkow (1997) and Volkow et. al. (1997) have shown that
the brains of long-term methamphetamine users have fewer dopamine receptors than those of non-
users. This research does not, however, establish whether the diﬀerence is due to drug exposure or, as
required by our hypothesis, to pre-existing neurological diﬀerences (or sensitivities).
44Longitudinal studies of preschoolers have shown that the length of time for which 4-year olds can
delay gratiﬁcation is correlated signiﬁcantly with their performance, as adolescents, on standardized
tests and parental ratings of competencies such as the ability to plan, exert self-control, and focus
(Metcalfe and Mischel [1999]).31
Finally, we have noted that the behavior of some addicts is sensitive to reminders
about the consequences of use (concerning, for example, the damage caused to his
family, or the likelihood of dying from an overdose). Since a reminder, by deﬁnition,
conveys no new information, it is diﬃcult to explain this sensitivity within thecontext of
the standard model. In contrast, reminders can inﬂuence the behavior of an individual
whose attention and memory are aﬀected by cues, by inducing the brain to activate
thoughts about information that it already possesses. While our model does not
formally depict the mechanisms by which reminders aﬀect behavior, its foundations are
consistent with the existence of these eﬀects. One can introduce these considerations
into our model in a stylized way by assuming that a reminder reduces the probability
of entering the hot cognitive mode.
5.5 Some extensions
One unrealistic aspect of our model is that the DM always makes the same choice in
each addictive state s.O n c e s exceeds an addictive state in which the DM selects
(E,1), it never falls below that state again. Similarly, the DM can never pass beyond
a state in which (R,0) is chosen. Consequently, the DM eventually becomes trapped
between the last state in which (E,1) is chosen and the ﬁrst state in which (R,0) is
chosen. One can overturn this property by introducing some additional uncertainty.
To illustrate, imagine that ws(e,x,a)=ws(e,x)+ηa. Suppose that, at the outset of
each period, η =( ηE,η A,η R) is determined at random by factors aﬀecting the DM’s
mood (stress, anxiety, etc.), and that the DM learns these values prior to making
any decisions. Conditional on any realization of η, our static analysis is unchanged.
Consequently, for any distribution of η, it is a simple matter to describe the choice
in any state s probabilistically. The dynamic analysis proceeds essentially as before
(except that the value function is computed as an expectation), and most of our results
c o n t i n u et oh o l d . W i t has u ﬃ c i e n t l ye x t r e m er e a l i z a t i o no fη, the DM can pass beyond
or below any addictive state.
Another unrealistic assumption is that the DM knows all of the parameters of the
problem prior to using the substance for the ﬁrst time. In a more realistic model, the
DM would learn a great deal through use (e.g. about the nature and intensity of the
“high”). This provides a motive for experimentation.45 To illustrate, imagine that
the individual is uncertain about the parameter vectors b, u,a n dc, and, for simplicity,
that this uncertainty is entirely resolved when the individual uses the substance for
the ﬁrst time. Since the DM’s expected discounted payoﬀ is linear in b, u,a n dc
45Here we discuss experimentation with use. The DM may also have a motive to experiment with
abstention in order to assess whether he is becoming (or likely to become) addicted. Hung [2000] and
Orphanides and Zervos [1995] study experimentation in the context of the rational addiction model.32
for each complete contingent plan, the optimized value function Vs(θ) must be convex
in these parameters (it corresponds to the upper envelope of linear functions). It
follows that initial usage (weakly) increases when a mean-preserving spread is applied
to the distributions of b, u,a n dc. Thus, although it is natural to conjecture that
the individual would be less willing to experiment with a substance in the presence of
greater uncertainty, this turns out to be incorrect.
This result has several practical implications. First, young people may be more
likely to experiment with addictive substances than older people, even if age is unrelated
to average tastes, and even if young people are no more likely to have biased expec-
tations concerning long-term costs, merely because the young are less certain about
their own tastes and proclivities. Second, experimentation with new substances (“fad
drugs”) is likely to be large simply because there is greater uncertainty about their
eﬀects. Third, information policies can discourage experimentation and use merely by
reducing uncertainty about the eﬀects of drugs, even if potential users already have un-
biased expectations. Fourth, as discussed in section 5.3.5, individuals may rationally
choose to begin using an addictive substance, and subsequently decide to quit without
a change in preferences.
Our model can also be extended, or in some cases simply reinterpreted, to describe
precommitment strategies other than rehabilitation. A particularly interesting strat-
egy entails the use of the agonist, antagonist, and metabolic medications described in
section 2.2. Under appropriate assumptions, one can interpret our model as encom-
passing this strategy. In particular, imagine that, at the beginning of each period,
the individual chooses between three actions: take a dose of disulﬁram (A), do not
take a dose of disulﬁram (E), or enter rehabilitation (R). In this context, we assume
that bA
s < 0 (consumption of alcohol becomes unpleasant) and pA
s <p E
s (anticipation
of unpleasant consequences makes it less likely that environmental cues will trigger
cravings).46 Plainly, the DM will select alternative A only if continued use is suﬃ-
ciently damaging (∆Vs(θ) large) and the reduction in the probability of unintended use
is large enough to overcome the unpleasant eﬀects of occasionally drinking after taking
disulﬁram.
In practice, compliance with the disulﬁram treatment regimen is a signiﬁcant prob-
lem (Goldstein [2001]). Conceivably, the failure to take disulﬁram could be attributable
to characterization failure. One could model this possibility by relaxing the assump-
tion that the DM necessarily enters each period in the cold cognitive mode. In such
a model, reducing the frequency with which the medication must be taken (e.g. to
every other period) would increase its eﬀectiveness at reducing usage of the addic-
46According to Goldstein [2001, p. 151], “an agent who, in the sober state, is motivated to take
[disulﬁram] regularly will be unlikely to succumb to the craving for a drink, knowing (perhaps from
one bad experience) what is bound to happen.”33
tive substance. In practice, therapeutic drugs with long-lasting eﬀects produce lower
frequencies of relapse than do drugs with more transient eﬀects (O’Brien [1997]).
6 Normative Analysis
Since our formulation of preferences is completely standard, the appropriate measure
of welfare is simply discounted experiential utility:
￿∞
t=0 δtwst(et,x t,a t). A policy
can improve welfare if and only if it reduces the probability of entering the hot mode
in an instance where this would lead to a suboptimal choice, or if it forces the agent to
make a preferred choice while in the hot cognitive mode.
Notably, in the case of constant use (for which the DM’s decisions in the hot
mode and cold mode coincide), the laissez faire outcome is ﬁrst-best, and no welfare-
improving policy exists, irrespective of whether characterization failure occurs with
high frequency. Thus, the development of a substance such as Aldox Huxley’s ﬁc-
tional “soma” from the classic novel Brave New World, which causes the user to feel
blissfully happy regardless of circumstances, would be welfare-improving according to
the normative criterion adopted herein. We acknowledge that this implication is con-
troversial.
In the remainder of this section, we study the welfare eﬀects of various public
policies concerning addictive substances. To focus our analysis on the implications of
characterization failure, we restrict attention to “demand side” welfare eﬀects, ignor-
ing “supply side” consequences associated with the development of black markets, the
spread of corruption, and enforcement costs.47 O u ro b j e c ti sn o tt op r o v i d eac o m p l e t e
normative analysis of drug policy. Instead, we investigate the extent to which various
government policies beneﬁt some users by helping them to overcome the adverse conse-
quences of characterization failure, and harm others by distorting deliberate (rational)
consumption. For simplicity, we assume throughout that the addictive substance is
competitively produced using a constant-returns-to-scale technology, so that supply
is inﬁnitely elastic at a price equal to some marginal cost q. We also ignore potential
consumption externalities.48 Since externalities provide a well-understood rationale for
government intervention, this permits us to isolate the welfare and policy implications
of characterization failure.
47Supply side eﬀects are discussed elsewhere; see e.g. See McCoun and Reuter [2001] and Miron
and Zwiebel [1995].
48There are three distinct classes of externalities to consider. First, the consumption of addictive
substances may inﬂict costs on others directly (such as accidents due to drunk driving or the spread
of infectious diseases). Second, for some substances, consumption is a social activity: a user enjoys
larger beneﬁts when others join in. Third, consumption by one individual may generate cues that
trigger characterization failure for others. Note that the ﬁrst and third considerations are external
diseconomies, while the second is an external economy.34
6.1 Taxation and subsidization
A number of addictive substances (e.g. nicotine and alcohol) are subject to heavy
taxation, and various forms of treatment are subsidized. It is therefore natural to
examine the welfare eﬀects taxes and subsidies.
When considering the welfare eﬀects of such policies, one must specify the dis-
position of revenues. The standard approach is to compute deadweight loss, which
corresponds to a thought experiment in which the revenues raised by the tax (required
by the subsidy) are returned to (obtained from) the individuals as lump-sum payments
(levies). In our model, one must specify the manner in which these lump sum transfers
are distributed across addictive states. This is important because we do not permit
the DM to borrow and lend, thereby redistributing income over time, and consequently
over addictive states. A policy that gives the same transfers to all agents regardless
of their addictive state would contaminate the experiment by introducing cross-state
transfers that, by assumption, are not available to the DM. To eliminate these spuri-
ous welfare gains and losses, thereby isolating the eﬀects of taxation and subsidization
on usage, one must modify the notion of deadweight loss by requiring that any tax
revenue raised from (subsidy paid to) an individual in a given period and state of ad-
diction is redistributed as a lump-sum payment back to (ﬁnanced by a lump-sum tax
on) that individual in the same period and state of addiction. In eﬀect, one visualizes
a large population wherein DMs are grouped by addictive state in each period, and
all resources aﬀected by taxes, subsidies, and lump-sum transfers remain within these
groups. While this construction is artiﬁcial, it is necessitated by the artiﬁciality of the
no-savings assumption.
First consider policies that tax or subsidize the activities E, A,a n dR.L e t σa
s
denote the monetary payment provided to an individual who engages in activity a while
in addictive state s; σs ≡ (σE
s ,σ A
s ,σR
s ), and σ ≡ (σ0,...,σ S). Note that this class of
policies includes subsidized rehabilitation, where the extent of the subsidy may vary
with the degree of addiction (σR
s > 0). One can also reinterpret the activities E and A
so that the class of policies under consideration subsumes needle exchanges,49 as well
as other “harm reduction” or “Dutch” programs that entail implicit subsidization.
The following result demonstrates that all policies belonging to the class described
above are dominated by laissez faire. The intuition is also simple: these policies distort
49Imagine that action E entails obtaining a clean needle (at some cost n), while action A does
not. Having a dirty needle reduces the likelihood of use if the DM enters the hot cognitive mode
(pA
s <p E
s ). Dirty needles adversely impact health (ws(e,1,A) <w s(e,1,E)). A subsidized needle
exchange program involves σE
s > 0. In this setting, one would not necessarily assume that uE
s >u A
s
(due to the cost n), but this assumption is not used in the proof of theorem 5. This depiction of a
needle exchange program assumes, of course, that users have opportunities to obtain and store clean
needles while in the cold cognitive mode.35
behavior in the cold mode, wherein there is no decision-making failure, but have no
eﬀect on the hot mode, wherein the DM makes mistakes. As a result, the usual results
concerning the ineﬃciency of taxation and subsidization apply.
Theorem 5: Let θ(σ) denote the vector of parameters derived from ws(e,x,a) when
the actions E, A,a n dR are taxed or subsidized according to the schedule σ and
revenues are distributed as lump sum payments within addictive states. Laissez
faire weakly dominates subsidization of rehabilitation: Vs(θ(σ)) ≤ Vs (θ(0)) for
all s, with strict inequality if χs (θ(σ)) ∩ χs (θ(0)) = ∅.
We turn our attention next to policies that impose per-unit taxes (or subsidies)
on addictive substances. Since usage is excessive in our model (except in the case of
constant use), it is natural to conjecture that taxation dominates laissez faire. However,
the logic behind theorem 5 should make one suspicious of this conjecture. When the
individual chooses to consume in the cold cognitive mode, there is no decision-making
failure to correct. When the individual chooses to consume in the hot cognitive mode,
but not in the cold mode, there is a decision-making failure. However, as long as choice
in the hot mode is insensitive to price, the mistake is not correctable through taxation.
A welfare-improving policy corrects mistakes made in the hot cognitive mode without
excessively distorting behavior in the cold mode. A tax has exactly the opposite eﬀect:
it distorts behavior in the cold mode, and by assumption has no eﬀect on choices made
in the hot mode.
Taxation of the addictive substance raises one additional complication. When the
DM selects (E,0) or (A,0), he pays the tax only in the hot mode, but receives a lump
sum payment in both modes. Thus, the tax redistributes income from the hot mode
to the cold mode. Since it is unrealistic to assume that the DM has any ability to
insure against random realizations of his cognitive mode, it is important to consider the
welfare eﬀects of this redistribution. As long as ordinary consumption and the addictive
substance are complements, intuition suggests that the redistribution is undesirable and
the tax is ineﬃcient; indeed subsidization may be superior to laissez faire. The same
intuition suggests that subsidization is ineﬃcient when ordinary consumption and the
addictive substance are substitutes; indeed, taxation may be superior to laissez faire.
Formally:
Theorem 6: Let θ(τ) denote the vector of parameters derived from ws(e,x,a) when
the addictive substance is subject to a per-unit tax (or subsidy) τ and revenues are
distributed as lump sum payments within addictive states. Suppose that ws(e,x,a)
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∂e for all e, then laissez faire dominates a per-unit subsidy
τ: for every state s and τ<0, Vs (θ(τ)) ≤ Vs (θ(0)), with strict inequality if
χs(θ(τ)) ∩ χs(θ(0)) = ∅.
Notice that the condition in part (ii) requires the degree of substitutability to be
suﬃciently strong (in light of the fact that reducing income by q tends to increase
the marginal beneﬁt from ordinary consumption). Thus the condition in part (i)
subsumes the case of separability between ordinary and addictive consumption, whereas
the condition in part (ii) does not. With separability, laissez faire dominates a positive
tax, but subsidization may dominate laissez faire.
In formulating our model, we made the extreme assumption that use in the hot
cognitive mode is completely insensitive to price, while use in the cold mode is poten-
tially price sensitive. As one introduces more price sensitivity in the hot cognitive
mode, taxes become more desirable (or less undesirable). However, when price sen-
sitivity is greater in the cold mode than in the hot mode (which seems realistic), the
logic of theorem 6 part (i) suggests that substantial taxes on addictive substances are
undesirable.50
6.2 Criminalization
Historically, criminalization has been the cornerstone of U.S. drug policy. Criminal-
ization aﬀects users through two distinct channels: a price eﬀect and a scarcity eﬀect.
The price eﬀect refers to changes in the marginal cost of using the substance resulting
from penalties and other costs imposed on users and suppliers. The scarcity eﬀect
refers to interference with the process of matching buyers and sellers: since criminal-
ization forces buyers and sellers to carry out transactions secretively, buyers sometimes
have diﬃculty locating supply. Let ∆q denote the eﬀective price increase (including
the certainty equivalent of penalties on users), and let γs denote the probability that
a DM who wants to buy the substance in state s is able to complete the purchase.51
50We conjecture that a small tax would be welfare improving in a model with continuous choices,
provided that consumption is suﬃciently price elastic in the hot state, irrespective of price sensitivity
in the cold state. The logic of this conjecture is as follows. When the tax rate is zero, a small tax
creates a second-order welfare loss by distorting behavior in the cold cognitive mode, but introduces
a ﬁrst-order welfare gain by improving choices in the hot mode (since the behavioral response would
reduce consumption from an excessive level). Even with a very small demand elasticity in the hot
mode, the second eﬀect dominates for suﬃciently small tax rates. The welfare eﬀect resulting from
redistributions between the hot and cold modes is also ﬁrst-order; this is why the elasticity in the hot
mode must be suﬃciently large.
51Probabilistic consumption changes the value function somewhat, but the results from section 5
extend to this case. See Goldstein and Kalant [1990] for evidence that drug usage declines as substances37
It is instructive to consider the scarcity and price eﬀects separately. Consider ﬁrst
a policy that only generates a price increase. This policy is equivalent to a per-unit-tax
policy (τ =∆ q)i nwhich the revenue raised by the tax is destroyed. From theorem 6
it follows that the policy is dominated by laissez-faire.
Now consider a policy that generates only scarcity eﬀects. Regardless of the DM’s
mode, this policy reduces the probability that an agent who wishes to use the substance
succeeds in doing so. If the DM chooses (E,1) in the cold mode, this is detrimental.
However, if the DM chooses either (E,0) or (A,0) in the cold mode, the eﬀect is
beneﬁcial, since it reduces unwanted consumption. Accordingly, the policy reduces
welfare when laissez faire leads to constant use, increases welfare when laissez faire
leads to non-use, and may either increase or decrease welfare for intermediate cases.
For some parameter values, a beneﬁcial scarcity eﬀect dominates the price eﬀect,
and criminalization is superior to laissez faire. This result deserves emphasis, inasmuch
as it is diﬃcult to justify a policy of criminalization based on demand-side welfare
considerations under many alternative theories of addiction.
Thus far, we have assumed that criminalization has the same scarcity eﬀect on
intended and unintended consumption. In practice, an individual who intends to con-
sume an illegal substance can set about locating supply deliberately and systematically,
and can maintain stocks in anticipation of transitory diﬃculties. Consequently, it is
natural assume that contrived scarcity leads to a larger reduction in the probability of
consuming when the individual does not intend to consume, than when consumption is
intentional. In that case, criminalization is more likely to produce a beneﬁcial scarcity
eﬀect.
6.3 Regulated dispensation
An ideal policy would eliminate consumption only when (i) the DM is in the hot
cognitive mode, and (ii) he would have chosen to abstain in the cold mode. Any such
policy would achieve the ﬁrst-best outcome, mimicking the case of a consumer who
never suﬀers from characterization failure (ps = 0 for all s).
The preceding observations lead us to consider a stylized policy of legalization
with regulated dispensation. Imagine, in particular, that the government licenses
vendors and requires them to respect the following dispensation procedure. Initially,
any consumer is permitted to obtain the substance at cost in any period. At the end
of any period t, a consumer can irreversibly revoke his own eligibility to receive the
substance in any future period t￿ >t , or set of future periods. We assume that supply
is only available through these regulated vendors.
Equipped with this transaction technology, consumers in our model can achieve the
become less available.38
ﬁrst best outcome. Solving the dynamic programming problem with ps = 0 for all s
yields a deterministic consumption path. The consumer can mimic this outcome by
revoking, in period t, his eligibility to receive the substance in period t+1i fando nl y
if x =0i nt+1 on the ﬁrst-best consumption path. In this way, the consumer himself
selectively creates optimal scarcity: the substance is available to him only when he
would choose to use it while in the cold mode. To put it somewhat diﬀerently, this
policy allows consumers to make optimal pre-commitments.52
Regulated dispensation becomes even more attractive relative to other policies when
one introduces heterogeneity across individuals. In our model, usage is optimal for
some addicts and suboptimal for others. Since the government cannot distinguish
among users with respect to this characteristic, it must impose a common policy for
all of them. With regulated dispensation, intentional users can continue to consume
the substance without impediment, while unintentional users nevertheless beneﬁt from
improved self-control.
In more realistic settings, the simple policy described above would not necessarily
permit the consumer to achieve the ﬁrst-best outcome. If, for example, the desir-
ability of using a substance in any given period depends upon factors (e.g. mood)
that remain imperfectly predictable until the period is underway, the individual may
in some instances regret revoking his eligibility to obtain the substance. Similarly, if
the individual can potentially remain in the hot state for several periods, he may chose
to revoke his eligibility to purchase the substance more than one period in advance,
and then subsequently regret this decision once the addictive state for the pertinent
period is realized. However, under the assumption that the individual never mistak-
enly elects to revoke future consumption privileges while in the hot mode, the policy
always weakly improves welfare ex ante relative to laissez faire. This assumption
strikes us as a reasonable approximation. When the use of an addictive substances is
pleasurable, it seems unlikely that an individual would, through conditioning, develop
a cognitive shortcut wherein the brain is focused on future avoidance of the substance,
and therefore inclined to make errors in this direction.
The advantages of regulated dispensation depend upon the government’s ability to
limit resale of the controlled substance and to suppress alternative sources of supply
(black market activity). The approach is more promising in instances where the
government can practically restrict administration of the substance to the dispensation
centers, thereby impeding the development of an illicit resale market.
52In a related analysis, Loewenstein, O’Donoghue, and Rabin [2000] emphasize the role of “manda-
tory waiting periods” in a model where agents systematically overconsume durable goods.39
6.4 Cognitive policies
In previous theories of addiction, government policy aﬀects use by altering opportunity
sets and/or by providing information. Our theory of addiction raises the additional
possibility that behavior might also respond to policies that inﬂuence cognition. Poten-
tial “cognitive policies” fall into two categories: those that alter environmental cues,
and those that alter the decision-making biases that emerge when individuals make
decisions in the hot mode.
Policies of the ﬁrst type include restrictions on public consumption, the regulation or
prohibition of advertising, and limitations on the location and/or method of sales (e.g.
outlawing displays). In each of these cases, the existence of a somewhat unconventional
externality (i.e. the impact of one individuals actions on the likelihood that another
will make a mistake) potentially justiﬁes public intervention.
Examples of policies within the second category include public advertising cam-
paigns that repeatedly present viscerally charged images concerning the consequences
of substance abuse (blackened lungs, impaired brains, gruesome car wrecks, and so
forth). By creating new visceral associations between usage and consequences, a cam-
paign may inﬂuence the pattern of cognitive activation during the hot mode, and
thereby reduce unintended consumption. Moreover, if charged images are presented
at the moment of consumption, they may counteract characterization failure by ac-
tivating thoughts about consequences that the DM would otherwise ignore. It is
therefore noteworthy that antismoking campaigns in Canada and Brazil mandate that
pack of cigarettes prominently display charged images such as cancerous lungs, severely
deformed newborns, and embarrassing situations involving erectile disfunction. Since
these are well-known consequences of smoking, the pictures act as emotional reminders,
but provide no new information.
The policies discussed in the previous paragraph amount to publicly provided atten-
tion management therapy. Since individuals can obtain therapy privately, government
intervention is justiﬁed only if there is an identiﬁable market failure, such as free-riding
in the provision of non-exclusive (public) broadcast messages.
In the context of our simple stylized model, one can depict the eﬀects of cognitive
policies as reductions in the probabilities pa
s. According to theorem 1, such policies
are welfare-improving even though, according the theorem 2, they may lead to greater
use and initial experimentation. As with regulated dispensation, cognitive policies
are attractive because they are non-coercive, because they accommodate individual
heterogeneity, and because they have the potential to reduce unintended use without
distorting choice in the cold cognitive mode.40
7C o n c l u s i o n s
We have developed and analyzed a model of addiction based on the premise that cog-
nition processes such as attention aﬀect behavior independently of preferences. In an
otherwise standard model of rational addiction, we allow for the possibility that the in-
dividual may enter a “hot” cognitive mode in which he always chooses to consume irre-
spective of underlying preferences (implicitly because inappropriate cognitive shortcuts
focus attention on usage and the associated “high”), and we assume that the likelihood
of entering this state is related to past choices (implicitly because, through condition-
ing, previous usage increases the probability of encountering environmental cues which
trigger the hot cognitive mode). The individual may also operate in a “cold” cognitive
mode, wherein he considers all alternatives and contemplates all consequences, includ-
ing the eﬀects of current choices on the likelihood of entering the hot cognitive mode
in the future. We have argued that the theory is consistent with foundational evidence
(e.g. from neuroscience and psychology) concerning the nature of decision-making and
addiction. The model is analytically tractable, and it accounts for a broad range of
stylized facts concerning addiction. It also generates a plausible qualitative mapping
from the characteristics of substances into consumption patterns, thereby providing a
basis for empirical tests. Finally, the theory provides a clear standard for evaluating
social welfare, and it has a number of striking policy implications.
We have intentionally deferred, until now, an important foundational question: how
does one deﬁne addiction? Even a casual reading of the literature reveals that this
is a diﬃcult and contentious issue. For example, is this phenomenon conﬁned to
drugs, or can individuals also be addicted to television, love, and french fries? Our
theory suggests an operational deﬁnition: an individual is addicted to a substance
or activity if he engages in repeated and unwanted consumption. This deﬁnition only
makes sense in the context of a theory, such as ours, where the notion of unwanted
consumption is well-deﬁned. Consumption that is repeated and wanted (as in the
case of constant use, which may describe the behavior of regular coﬀee drinkers), does
not constitute addiction. Similarly, an activity that is unwanted but not repeated (an
isolated mistake) is not an addiction. Under our deﬁnition, addictions may include
pathological gambling, overeating, compulsive shopping, and kleptomania. Individuals
who suﬀer from these conditionsoften experience visceral statescomparableto cravings,
respond to cues such as stress and advertisements, and exhibit cycles of binges and
abstention.53
53See Holden (2001a) for a discussion of recent research concerning the commonalities between these
behavioral pathologies and substance addiction. For example, compulsive gamblers and kleptomaniacs
respond to drugs such as naltrexone which block the brain’s ability to experience euphoric states;
compulsive gamblers and bulimics experience sudden relapse even after many years of abstinence.41
Appendix
Proof of Theorem 1
Step 1: The proof of continuity is standard, and thus omitted.






k , or a decrease in ck.L e t θ￿ denote the new vector
of parameters. Clearly, if the DM follows ξs in every state s when the parameters are
θ￿, he will receive an expected discounted payoﬀ in each state s not lower than Vs(θ).
Accordingly, the highest achievable expected discounted payoﬀ in each state is not
lower than Vs(θ). Since χs(θ￿) provides the greatest achievable expected discounted
payoﬀ in every state, Vs(θ￿) ≥ Vs(θ)f o ra l ls.
Step 3: Let ξs b ea n yd e c i s i o nr u l es u c ht h a tξs ∈ χs(θ)f o ra l ls.L e t θ￿ denote the
vector of parameters obtained by decreasing pE
k by ∆E and pA
k by ∆A (with ∆a ≥ 0).
Consider a probabilistic decision rule πs(a,x) (which denotesthe probability of selecting
(a,x) in state s) deﬁned as follows: (i) for all s  = k, πs(a,x)=1i fξs =( a,x),






k +∆E and πk(E,1) = ∆E
1−pE





k +∆A and πk(A,1) = ∆
A
1−pA
k +∆A,a n d( 5 )i fξk =( R,0), then πk(R,0) = 1. It is
straightforward to verify that following πs(a,x) when the parameters are θ￿ yields an
expected discounted payoﬀ in each state s of exactly Vs(θ). Reasoning as in step 2, it
follows that Vs(θ￿) ≥ Vs(θ)f o ra l ls. Q.E.D.
Proof of Theorem 2
We begin the proof with two lemmas.
Lemma 1: Consider θ and θ￿ such that: (1) θ￿
k ￿= θk,( 2 )θ￿
i = θi for i ￿= k,a n d( 3 )
Vs(θ￿) ≥ Vs(θ) for all s.T h e n :
(i) for all j<k , Vj(θ￿) −Vj(θ) ≤ Vj+1(θ￿) −Vj+1(θ),
(ii) for all j>k , Vj(θ￿) − Vj(θ) ≤ Vj−1(θ￿) −Vj−1(θ).
Proof: We provide a proof of part (i). The argument for part (ii) is symmetric.
In the proof, we make the dependence of λa,x
s on θ explicit by writing λa,x
s (θ).
We claim that for all j<k , Vj(θ￿)−Vj(θ) ≤ Vj+1(θ￿)−Vj+1(θ). Consider ﬁrst the
case j =1 .( T h ec a s ej = 0 is almost identical and thus is omitted).54









54The argument makes use of the fact that, for any eight real numbers z1,...,z8,m a x i∈{1,2,3,4} zi −





1 (θ ) − λ
a,x
1 (θ))
= δmax{V2(θ ) −V2(θ),(1 −pE
1 )(V1(θ ) − V1(θ)) +pE
1 (V2(θ ) −V2(θ)),
(1 − pA
1 )(V1(θ ) −V1(θ)) + pA
1 (V2(θ ) −V2(θ)),V1(θ ) − V1(θ)}
Consider the last expression. Given the linearity of the second and third terms, there
are two possible cases. If the fourth term is the maximand then, since δ ∈ (0,1),
V1(θ ) − V1(θ)=0≤ V2(θ ) − V2(θ) (the last inequality follows from the statement of
the theorem). If the ﬁrst term is the maximand, the claim trivially holds.
Now consider the following induction step. We show that for all j<k ,
Vj−1(θ ) −Vj−1(θ) ≤ Vj(θ ) − Vj(θ) ⇒ Vj(θ ) − Vj(θ) ≤ Vj+1(θ ) −Vj+1(θ).
Arguing as above, we have
Vj(θ ) −Vj(θ) ≤ δmax{Vj+1(θ ) − Vj+1(θ), (5)
(1 − pE
j )(Vj−1(θ ) −Vj−1(θ)) +pE
j (Vj+1(θ ) −Vj+1(θ)),
(1 − pA
j )(Vj−1(θ ) −Vj−1(θ)) +pA
j (Vj+1(θ ) −Vj+1(θ)),V j−1(θ ) −Vj−1(θ)}
As before, there are two possible cases. If the fourth term is the maximand we obtain
Vj(θ ) − Vj(θ) ≤ δ(Vj−1(θ ) −Vj−1(θ)) ≤ δ(Vj(θ ) −Vj(θ));
where the last inequality follows from the induction hypothesis. This implies that
Vj(θ￿) − Vj(θ)=0≤ Vj+1(θ￿) − Vj+1(θ). If the ﬁrst term is the maximand, the claim
trivially holds. (Note that this establishes the claim only for j<k ; (5) does not hold
for j = k since θ￿
k  = θk). Q.E.D.
Lemma 2: Consider θ and θ￿ such that: (1) θ￿
k ￿= θk,( 2 )θ￿
i = θi for i ￿= k,a n d( 3 )
Vs(θ￿) ≥ Vs(θ) for all s.T h e n :
(i) For j<k , usage in state j is weakly higher with θ￿ than with θ,
(ii) For j>k , usage in state j is weakly lower with θ￿ than with θ.
Proof: Consider any θ and θ￿ that diﬀer only with respect to state k,a n da s s u m e
that valuation in all states is higher with θ￿ than with θ. Lemma 1 tells us that, for
j<k ,
Vmax{1,j−1}(θ ) − Vmax{1,j−1}(θ) ≤ Vj+1(θ ) −Vj+1(θ).
(The case j = 0 is identical and thus is omitted). Rearranging this expression yields:
∆Vj(θ ) ≤ ∆Vj(θ).43
Since the parameters for state j have not changed, this implies that usage in state
j must be weakly higher with θ  than with θ (see section 5.1). Using a symmetric
argument for j>kcompletes the proof. Q.E.D.
Now we prove theorem 2. Parts (i) and (ii) follow directly from lemma 2 and
theorem 1. The proof of part (iii) proceeds as follows.




j , with all
other components equal. We claim that, if (E,1) ∈ χj(θ), then (E,1) ∈ χj(θ).
Consider any optimal decision function for parameters θ mapping each state to a
unique choice, χs (that is, χs ∈ χs(θ) for all s). Imagine that the DM follows the
optimal decision rule χs, and that he starts from state j−1 in period 0. Let gt indicate
the probability of reaching state j +1 for the ﬁrst time in exactly t periods (note that
q1 =0 ,a n dt h a tqs = 0 for all s when χi =( R,0) for i = j,j − 1). Let Gt indicate
the expected discounted payoﬀ for periods 0 through t −2, conditional upon reaching
state j +1 for the ﬁrst time in exactly t periods. If there is a positive probability that
state j + 1 will never be reached, let G∞ denote the expected payoﬀ for all periods
conditional on this event (otherwise let G∞ = 0). Note that Gt and G∞ are the same
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t=2 gtδt−1 < 1, this implies




j + δ(Vj+1(θ) −Vj+1(θ))
Consequently,
∆Vj(θ) − ∆Vj(θ)=[ Vj−1(θ) − Vj+1(θ)] − [Vj−1(θ) − Vj+1(θ)]













(where, in the last step, we have used δ<1 along with the fact that, by theorem 1,






























But this implies (E,1) ∈ χj(θ).






j (and all other
components equal). We claim that, if (E,x)  ∈ χj(θ)f o rx =0 ,1, then χj(θ)=χj(θ).
It is easy to check that Vs(θ)=Vs(θ)s a t i s ﬁ e s( 1 )t h r o u g h( 4 )f o ra l ls when θ = θ.
Consequently, Vs(θ) is also the optimized value function with θ,a n dt h ee l e m e n t so f
χj(θ) maximize the expression (4) for state j with θ = θ.






j (and all other
components equal). We claim that, if (E,0) ∈ χj(θ)f o rx =0 ,1, then (a,0)  ∈ χj(θ)
for a = A,R. Suppose on the contrary that (a,0) ∈ χj(θ)f o ra ∈ {A,R}. Then,
arguing as in step 2, Vs(θ)=Vs(θ). It is easy to check that this implies (E,0) cannot
maximize the expression (4) for state j with θ = θ,s o( E,0)  ∈ χj(θ), which is a
contradiction.





other components equal), any element of χj(θ)\χj(θ) must involve less usage than any
element of χj(θ), and any element of χj(θ)\χj(θ)must involve more usage than any
element of χj(θ). Consequently, usage is (weakly) increasing in bE
j .
Step 4: Consider any θ and θ that diﬀer only with respect to pE
j , uR
j , and/or cj.
We claim that, if (E,1) ∈ χj(θ), then (E,1) ∈ χj(θ). This is a corollary of Theorem
3, part (i), which is proven below.
Combining steps 2, 3, and 4, we conclude that, for θ and θ with pE
j ≤ pE
j (and all
other components equal), any element of χj(θ)\χj(θ) must involve less usage than any
element of χj(θ), and any element of χj(θ)\χj(θ)must involve more usage than any
element of χj(θ). Consequently, usage is (weakly) decreasing in pE
j .
Step 5: Consider any θ and θ with uR
j ≥ uR
j and/or cj ≤ cj (and all other
components equal). We claim that if (R,0)  ∈ χj(θ), then χj(θ)=χj(θ). The
argument is analogous to that given in step 2.
Step 6: Consider any θ and θ with uR
j ≥ uR
j and/or cj ≤ cj (and all other
components equal). We claim that if (R,0) ∈ χj(θ), then (a,0)  ∈ χj(θ)f o ra = E,A.
The argument is analogous to that given for step 3.
Combining steps 4, 5, and 6, we conclude that, for θ and θ with uR
j ≥ uR
j and/or
cj ≤ cj (and all other components equal), any element of χj(θ)\χj(θ)m u s ti n v o l v el e s s45
usage than any element of χj(θ), and any element of χj(θ)\χj(θ)must involve more
usage than any element of χj(θ). Consequently, usage is (weakly) decreasing in uR
j
and (weakly) increasing in cj. Q.E.D.
Proof of Theorem 3
(i) Consider some θ￿ for which (E,1) ∈ χj(θ￿). Suppose that θ￿￿ coincides with





j , and/or cj (subject to the restrictions imposed by
assumptions 1 and 2). We claim that (E,1) ∈ χj(θ￿￿). By construction, Vs(θ￿)s a t i s ﬁ e s
(1) through (4) for θ = θ￿.W e a r g u e t h a t Vs(θ￿￿)=Vs(θ￿) also satisﬁes (1) through (4)
for θ = θ￿￿. Under the hypothesis that Vs(θ￿￿)=Vs(θ￿), we have λa,x
s (θ￿)=λa,x
s (θ￿￿)
for all s  = j,a n df o r( s,a,x)=( j,E,1). Thus, (4) is satisﬁed for all s  = j.S i n c e
(E,1) ∈ χj(θ￿) we know that (E,1) maximizes (4) for state j with θ = θ￿,w h i c hi s









so (E,1) remains a maximizer for state j with θ = θ￿￿.S i n c e λE,1
s (θ￿)=λE,1
s (θ￿￿), the
maximized value of (4) is unchanged with θ = θ￿￿. Accordingly, Vs(θ￿￿)=Vs(θ￿)i s
the maximized value function when θ = θ￿￿,a n dχj(θ￿￿) is the set of optimal choices in
state j.
(ii) Consider some θ for which (R,0) ∈ χn(θ). Construct some θ￿ by increasing the
values of pa
k or ck,o rb yd e c r e a s i n gt h ev a l u e so fba
k or ua
k,f o rs o m ek>n .B y t h e o r e m
2p a r t( i ) ,( R,0) ∈ χn(θ). Consider the optimization problem formed by restricting
the model to addictive states 0 through n, and imposing the action (R,0) in state n.
This problem has the same solution as the complete problems with either θ or θ￿ on
states 0 through n since conditions (1) to (4) coincide on these states. It follows that
the optimal solution at θ￿ remains unchanged for states 0 through n.
(iii) The proof is analogous to that of part (ii). Q.E.D.
Proof of Theorem 4
Step 1. We show that V0(θ) ≥ V1(θ). Since (E,1) is an option at s =0 ,w e
have that V0(θ) ≥ uE
0 +bE
0 +δV1(θ). Furthermore, since the substance is destructively








1−δ . These two inequalities imply
that V0(θ) ≥ (1 − δ)V1(θ)+δV1(θ)=V1(θ).
Step 2 N o ww es h o wt h a tVs−1(θ) ≥ Vs(θ)i m p l i e sVs(θ) ≥ Vs+1(θ). We consider
four cases. These cases are not mutually exclusive, but they are exhaustive.
(i) (E,1) ∈ χs(θ). In this case, Vs(θ)=uE
s + bE
s + δVs+1(θ). Furthermore, since
states lower than s are never reached (once the DM is in state s), and the substance is






1−δ . The argument then proceeds
as in step 1.
(ii) (R,0) ∈ χs+1(θ). In this case we have that
Vs+1(θ)=uR
s+1 −cs+1 + δVs(θ) ≤ uE
s +bE
s + δVs(θ).46
Also, Vs(θ) ≥ uE
s +bE
s +δVs+1(θ)s i n c e( E,1) is an option at state s.T h i si m p l i e st h a t
Vs(θ) ≥ Vs+1(θ) − δVs(θ)+δVs+1(θ) and thus Vs(θ) ≥ Vs+1(θ).










1−δ , so uE
s + bE
s ≥
(1−δ)Vs+1(θ). Also, at state s we have that Vs(θ) ≥ uE
s +bE
s +δVs+1(θ) (since (E,1)
is available as an option). Combining these inequalities yields Vs(θ) ≥ Vs+1(θ).
(iv) Two conditions hold: (a) either (E,0) ∈ χs+1(θ)o r( A,0) ∈ χs+1(θ), and (b)
(E,1)  ∈ χs(θ). Consider a such that (a,0) ∈ χs+1(θ). Since bE
s+1 ≥ 0, we must have
Vs(θ) ≥ Vs+2(θ)( o t h e r w i s e( E,1) would be preferable to (a,0) at s + 1). Suppose,




























s +δVs+1(θ)) +(1 − pa
s)(ua
s + δVs−1(θ)) (see below)
≤ Vs(θ),





δ , w h i c hi nt u r ni m p l i e sua
s + δVs−1(θ) ≥ ua
s +ba
s + δVs+1(θ).





that ∆V0(θ) ≥ 0. By the conditions in section 5.1, it follows that (E,1)  ∈ χ0(θ)w h e n
bE
0 < 0. Q.E.D.
Proof of Theorem 5
Let Ts(σ) denote the lump-sum tax (possibly negative) that the DM pays in state
s with the tax-subsidy scheme σ. W ec l a i mt h a t ,i ft h eD Mf o l l o w sχs(θ(σ)) when
the parameter vector is θ(0), he achieves an expected discounted payoﬀ in each state s
of Vs(θ(σ)). From this it follows immediately that the optimized value function with
θ(0) satisﬁes Vs(θ(0)) ≥ Vs(θ(σ)), as required, with strict inequality if no member of
χs(θ(σ)) is optimal with the parameter vector θ(0).
To establish the claim, suppose that the DM selects a decision rule (ζ,ψ)w i t h
(ζs,ψs) ∈ χs(θ(σ)) for all s. Government budget balance (with no redistributions
between addictive states) requires Ts(σ)=σζs
s .I f ζs = E or A, then with tax-subsidy
scheme σ the choice (ζs,ψs) confers instantaneous utility in state s of
uζs
s (σ)+ψsbζs
s (σ)=ws(ys −ψsq − Ts(σ)+σζs
s ,ψ s,ζ s)




Similarly, if ζs = R,t h e nw i t ht a x - s u b s i d ys c h e m eσ the choice (ζs,ψ s) confers instan-
taneous utility in state s of
uR




s (0) − cs(0)
It follows that the decision rule (ζ,ψ) generates the same expected discounted utility
in all states with σ as with no tax-subsidy scheme. Q.E.D.
Proof of Theorem 6
Let Ts(τ) denote the lump-sum payment (possibly negative) that the DM pays in
state s with the tax-subsidy τ. W ec l a i mt h a t ,i ft h eD Mf o l l o w sχs(θ(τ)) when the
parameter vector is θ(0), he achieves an expected discounted payoﬀ in each state s
of no less than Vs(θ(τ)). From this it follows immediately that the optimized value
function with θ(0) satisﬁed Vs(θ(0)) ≥ Vs(θ(τ)), as required, with strict inequality if
no member of χs(θ(σ)) is optimal with parameter vector θ(0).
To establish the claim, suppose that the DM selects a decision rule (ζ,ψ)w i t h
(ζs,ψs) ∈ χs(θ(τ)) for all s. Government budget balance (with no redistributions





τ when ζs = E or A,
and Ts(σ)=0w h e nζs = R.
If (ζs,ψ s)=( E,1), then with tax-subsidy τ t h ec h o i c e( E,1) confers instantaneous
utility in state s of
uE
s (τ)+bE
s (τ)=ws(ys − (q + τ)+Ts(τ),1,E)




If (ζs,ψ s)=( R,0), then with tax-subsidy τ the choice (R,0) confers instantaneous
utility in state s of
uE
s (τ) − cs(σ)=ws(ys − rs + Ts(τ),0,E)
= ws(ys − rs,0,E)
= uR
s (0) −cs(0)
If (ζs,ψ s)=( a,0) with a = E or A, then with tax-subsidy τ the choice (a,0) confers





sws(ys −(q + τ)+Ts(τ),1,a)+( 1− pa
s)ws(ys +Ts(τ),0,a)48
= pa
































∂e (as in part (i) of the theorem). Imagine
that τ>0. Since ws(e,x,a)i sc o n c a v ei ne,






























∂ws(ys −q + z,1,a)
∂e
dz
=( 1 − pa
s)ws(ys −q +pa
sτ,1,a)+pa
sws(ys − q −(1− pa
s)τ,1,a) −ws(ys − q,1,a)
≤ 0,





s)τ)=ys −q. Thus, for all states, the choice (ζs,ψ s) confers weakly greater
instantaneous utility with no tax than with the tax. It follows that the decision rule






∂e (as in part (ii) of the theorem).

















sws(ys − q −(1−pa
s)τ,1,a)+( 1− pa
s)ws(ys −q +pa
sτ,1,a) −ws(ys − q,1,a)
≤ 0,
As before, it follows that the decision rule (ζ,ψ) generates weakly greater expected
discounted utility in all states with no subsidy than with τ<0. Q.E.D.49
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Figure 1: Optimal decision rule within a period.56
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Figure 2: Graphical representation of the optimal decision rule.